Syria Without Assad: What Russia Stands to Lose

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's asylum in Moscow marks a turning point, leaving Russia grappling with diminished diplomatic, military, and economic influence in a post-Assad, Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Syria amid the prioritized Russia-Ukraine conflict.

On December 8, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad landed in Moscow and was granted asylum on humanitarian grounds, leaving behind a rebel-ruled Syria and the legacy of a decades-long regime backed by Russia. The now-marred Assad family “dynasty” had been formerly supported by the Soviet Union, both due to Baathist-Soviet ideological alignment and as a byproduct of Cold War-era power dynamics in the Middle East. Russian President Vladimir Putin inherited these vested priorities, helping to keep Bashar al-Assad's regime intact during the Syrian Civil War and thereafter while maintaining its enduring diplomatic commitments, tactically-situated military bases, and evolving economic interests in conflict-ridden Syria. With Assad now out of Syria and no longer in power, Russia is likely to suffer a major geopolitical loss in the Middle East along these diplomatic, military, and economic fronts. As the Russia-Ukraine war remains the Kremlin’s priority, it is unclear whether Russia currently has the bandwidth to preserve its holdings in Syria by negotiating with the new HTS-led Syrian government.

HTS-Led Syria Will Undermine Russia’s Diplomatic Frameworks

Under Assad’s regime, Syria served as Russia’s conduit for diplomatic relations as a security guarantor in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. However, negotiations with the HTS will prove challenging in maintaining certain diplomatic ties with regional partners, as guarantees in Syria have not been met.

During the 2015 Syrian Civil War, Russia’s military campaign to support the Assad government attracted strategic interest from many countries in the MENA region. The Russia-Syria-Iran-Iraq (RSII) coalition, formed in September 2015, facilitated intelligence sharing against anti-Assad forces. By December 2016, Russia introduced the Astana model, uniting Turkey, Iran, and other Arab nations in talks despite divergent interests that ultimately reduced violence in Syria. As a proprietor of the Astana model, Russia achieved a diplomatic victory Russia solidifying its role as the primary security broker in Syria and broader MENA region.  

Although Syria is far from a lynchpin in the Kremlin’s conditional foreign policy priorities, a Syria without Assad, according to Nikolay Kozhanov, Consulting Fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, “undermine(s) the confidence of potential allies in Russian (security) guarantees”. Formerly established diplomatic channels are likely to fail—the RSII will likely crumble due to Russia’s designation of the HTS as a terrorist organization while the Astana model falters. While all parties stress an end to military escalation in Syria, diverging interests—such as Turkey’s recognition of the HTS-led government—further isolate Russia, which remains committed to Assad-era policies. It is now Russia who is insecure, as its Syrian military holdings remain in jeopardy. 

Syria Without Assad Means Russian Military Bases Without Stability  

While Russia has withdrawn most of its troops from Syria, its biggest military casualties are likely its two lone naval and air bases that remain both unstable and inaccessible.  

Tartus, Russia’s Soviet-era naval base on the northern seaport edge of the namesake Syrian city, is a logistical hub for operations in the MENA region and a crucial access point to the Mediterranean Sea. Following the successful Syrian-rebel offensive since November 27, 2024, the Kremlin’s fleet has been seen moving in and out of the base, as reported by the Institute of the Study of War. As Tartus faces Israeli-led missile strikes, Russia's access to the Mediterranean Sea, a key waterway for both trade and warm-water access, will be limited to other unstable MENA proxies such as Algeria and Libya. Both countries have their own geopolitical complexities that may hinder prompt Russian military decision-making. 

Khmeimim, Russia’s 2015 Syrian Civil War-era air base located in Latakia, may face a similar fate under the HTS-led Syrian government. Crucial for Russian troop movements in and out of Syria as part of Syrian security missions or broader military contracts, the air base came under attack by Syrian rebel forces on December 7, 2024, leading to the evacuation of Russian air assets such as the S-400 and Tor air defense systems to Tartus while struggling to evacuate Russian nationals.  

Negotiations between the Kremlin and the HTS-led Syrian government about the residual Russian military presence in Tartus and Khmeimim remain uncertain as of December 16, 2024, according to Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov. Without being able to move Russian military assets at will, Russia loses essential access points and bases from which it can exert its influence on other potential military campaigns and even trade relations in the MENA region. 

Likely Decline in Russian Arms Exports and Wheat Trade with Post-Assad Syria 

Negotiations with the HTS-led Syrian government are not likely to be conducive for a return to Assad-government trade levels. 

Historically, Syria has been a significant customer of Russian arms, particularly during the Syrian Civil War. Anna Borshchevskaya, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, noted that this conflict became the perfect advertising arena for Russian arms to the broader MENA region. However, recent projections indicate a decline in Russian arms exports to the Middle East. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's 2024 fact sheet, only 13% of Russia's arms exports go to the Middle East, with a 53% drop in annual arms exports between 2019-2023.  Without Assad in Syria, Russia lacks stable venues like Tartus and Khmeimim to display its large arms, and the HTS-led Syrian government is unlikely to allow additional Russian arms imports, only to further decrease Russian arms exports globally and to the Middle East. 

Following extensive sanctions due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia has increased its wheat exports to Syria. With environmental factors reducing wheat production in Syria, Dr. Haid Haid from Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme noted that Syria has grown closer to Russia due to its lack of fear of secondary sanctions, as it is already heavily sanctioned. However, on December 13, 2024, Reuters reported that a source close to the Kremlin stated Russia is suspending its wheat exports to Syria due to the sensitivity of the ongoing situation in Syria. This suspension may diminish not only Russia’s export capacity but also its ability to evade Western-imposed sanctions. Assad maintained stable Russia-Syria wheat trade; without him, such stability is unlikely. 

Even Without Assad, The Ukraine Campaign Comes First 

Looking ahead, as the Russia-Ukraine War remains a priority for Russia, negotiations with the HTS-led Syrian government will likely prove to be difficult and uncertain.  

With Russia previously withdrawing troops from Syria to send to the Ukrainian front, indicators consistently show that Syria remains secondary to the Ukraine campaign. Although Russia has much at stake, it is unlikely to shift its priorities as the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues. However, if the conflict ends with some negotiation victories for Russia, it is plausible that Syria will regain importance on Russia’s priority list. This is not just about Assad and Syria, but also Russia's influence in the MENA region and its broader campaign for a multipolar world order, aligning with Russia’s conditional approach to foreign policy. The MENA region will remain a battleground for competing interests and influences, and if Russia's resources allow, it will likely continue to throw its hat in the ring and give it its best shot. 
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Konstantin Shchelkunov

Konstantin is a second year accelerated Master of Public Policy student from Manassas, Virginia. He graduated from the University of Virginia in 2024 with a B.A. in Foreign Affairs and Economics. His primary policy interest is foreign policy, with a particular focus on national security, economic statecraft, and international trade in the Russia/Eurasia region. At UVA, he researched E.U.-Russia trade relations, International Criminal Court jurisdiction, and asset forfeiture related to the Ukraine conflict and is completing his Master’s capstone on the lack of local-level accountability in Ukraine, which hinders U.S. official development assistance for regional economic reconstruction. He is also a graduate research assistant at the Miller Center of Public Affairs.

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