
From the Editor

Dear Reader,

Here in the Commonwealth, spring has finally sprung. Graduation preparations are beginning at the University of Virginia, and the air is full of anticipation, excitement, and relief from those finishing their semester coursework – some for the last time.

The Batten School recently celebrated its 10th anniversary. The anniversary gala drew alumni from all over the country, as old friends and new faces mingled in the Great Hall over drinks and barbecue. As the Batten School solidifies its place in the world of public policy schools, the Virginia Policy Review is proud to have earned our place as a Batten institution, publishing the work of students and faculty members each year.

In January 2017, VPR successfully hosted the fifth annual National Journal Conference, drawing public policy students from William & Mary, The George Washington University, and Cornell University, among others. In March, I traveled to the Harvard Kennedy School with two members of the incoming executive board, Dylan Kolb and Anna Troutman, to meet with the Kennedy student journal staff. We exchanged ideas and discussed how our journals might work together on co-publishing, or co-sponsoring events in the future. VPR's creativity and enthusiasm to collaborate with other journals is what makes our organization special. I look forward to next year's staff continuing to further these conversations, wherever they may lead.

The 2016 presidential election has left Americans bitterly divided along party lines. The failed repeal of the Affordable Care Act, a major campaign promise of President Trump's, brought healthcare to the forefront of the national conversation. Now, with mounting tensions in Syria and the Middle East, foreign policy is shaping up to be President Trump's next big challenge. In an era when "fake news" and "alternative facts" can run rampant, VPR aims to provide a forum for fact-based policy writing, to move these debates away from ideology, and towards civil discourse.

This Spring 2017 edition of VPR explores a wide range of topics, from President Trump's immigration policies, to universal basic income, to the role of policy analysis in journalism and media. I would like to extend a special thanks to the authors who dedicated their time, ideas and research to crafting these pieces and submitting them to our journal. I would also like to thank the VPR editors, who worked with authors diligently throughout the editing process to ensure the quality of our final product.

I hope you will enjoy reading this edition as much as we enjoyed putting it together. As this is my last note as Editor-in-Chief, I wish the best of luck to next year's journal staff in continuing the challenging and rewarding work of leading VPR.

Sincerely,
Kelly Kaler
Editor-in-Chief

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Table of Contents

Commentary in Brief

I. The Future of Policy Advocacy NGOs – 6

By Gerald Warburg

II. Policy Analysis in Journalism: How to Use the Policy Memo Framework in Television News Reporting – 13

By Nora Neus, M.P.P.

III. The Conservative Case for a Universal Basic Income - 17

By Herman Mark Schwartz

IV. Closing the Divide: President Trump’s Maternal Leave Policy and the “Highest, Hardest” Glass Ceiling - 19

By Anna Troutman

Commentary in Depth

V. Undocumented Virginians in the Age of Trump - 22

By Jessica F. Chilin-Hernández

VI. Women, Water, and a Way Forward - 28

By Michelle Cho, M.P.P.

VII. The Preservation of the Monroe Doctrine and the Cold War: Nicaragua and the United States - 35

By Kristin M. Fioretti

VIII. Gender Diversity in Politics: Current Trends - 46

By Jacquelyn Katuin

IX. Should Virginia Join the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative? - 50

By Lena Lewis

X. The Future of Foreign Policy with Iran, Considering Our Complex Past - 61

By Tara Razjouyan

XI. The Extent and Limitations of the North American Alliance System - 67

By Hayley Anderson

XII. The Madman and the Bomb: Nuclear Blackmail in the Trump Era - 81

By Todd S. Sechser, Ph.D., and Matthew Fuhrmann, Ph.D.

The Future of Policy Advocacy NGOs

By Gerald Warburg

The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the civic life of the United States has grown substantially since the 1960s (Frank Batten School of Leadership & Public Policy, 2016). NGO engagement in shaping public policies while providing targeted social services promises to expand in the future as well. NGOs will be challenged, however, by the decline of voter confidence and growing suspicion of the ability of government to deliver sound policies. Support for a host of institutions western democracies created in the wake of World War II is diminishing. From Wall Street to Main Street, from Congress to the Catholic Church, from the White House to the mainstream media, institutions that once enjoyed the confidence of the majority of U.S. citizens have been under assault. To fill the void and to advance the agenda of diverse interest groups, NGOs have expanded their ranks and their reach (Urban Institute, U.S. Department of State).

NGOs in American History

The phenomenon of civic associations impacting U.S. policy is by no means a new one. Going back to the original Boston Tea Party and the Sons of Liberty, American citizens have shown an unusual propensity to form advocacy organizations. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison used their pens in 1787 to lobby for ratification of the U.S. Constitution, hastily producing the *Federalist Papers*. A half century later, Alexis de Tocqueville observed how readily Americans engaged each other and formed civic associations to advance common interests. From the abolitionists to the Woman's Temperance League, Americans have organized at the grassroots to press for government action since our nation's inception. In 1912, loyalists of President Taft created the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to combat reformers led by his predecessor Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive Party. The model of civic organizations further expanded in the post-World War II era, especially with the civil rights movement and efforts to advance environmental protection.

Many of the new policy advocacy organizations that emerged in the 1960s came to be known as "public interest groups." Citizen-led groups and social service delivery organizations backed diverse causes, as well as special interests. They were not uniformly 'progressive' in their focus. Groups eager to require a balanced federal budget, to protect the rights of the unborn, and to expand the reading of Second Amendment rights of gun owners also adopted the NGO model to advance their agendas. So did the 21st century Tea Party. In the wake of Donald Trump's election as president, a number of progressive groups moved in similar fashion to challenge the policies of the new administration. Grassroots action and legal challenges to executive orders on immigration and environmental protection were initially led not by Democrats in Congress, but by NGO leaders from such groups as the American Civil Liberties Union and Indivisible, who enjoyed a sharp increase in membership donations.

Defining NGOs

How, precisely, does one define an NGO? NGOs are extraordinary in that they are defined by what they are *not*. In the U.S., they are literally organizations that are not run by the government, yet are involved in shaping government policy or providing public services. This essay embraces a broad definition, focusing on the public advocacy efforts of local, state, and national interest groups engaged in policymaking. The National Rifle Association is a trade association, but it relies heavily on grassroots member support and lobbies effectively for public policy changes through membership engagement. Therefore, it should also be

studied as an NGO. Similar points can be made about groups as diverse as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Sierra Club. Each exists for the express purpose of shaping public policy and representing the public policy interests of supporters.

Literature on NGO best practices has yet to be fully developed (Crutchfield et. al., Jossey-Bass et. al., Worth). Central questions should be explored for insights, including queries such as: *What makes some NGOs far more effective than others? How do some NGOs develop sustainable models while others have a half-life measured in months, not decades? What is the secret to sound management of NGO teams? How do mature organizations avoid the perils of “mission creep” or “founder’s syndrome?” Can NGOs develop profit-generating revenue streams without compromising their goals?*

Some universities place NGO research and management training in departments of politics, schools of law or Master of Business (MBA) programs. Others carve out a niche in professional schools offering graduate students a Master of Public Policy (MPP) or Master of Public Administration (MPA) degree. Public policy schools—the most natural home for the study of NGOs—have been slow to pivot from their original focus. Founded in the post-World War II era of rapid federal government growth culminating in the Great Society programs of the Johnson Administration, the curriculum that many MPP and MPA programs use is often focused on training analysts to staff government bureaucracies. Professional training programs for NGO leaders are still rare, despite the fact that a substantial portion of those who earn MPP and MPA degrees head to jobs in this sector (NASPAA, 2016).

21st Century NGOs

The rise of anti-government sentiment and populist grassroots movements challenging the establishment of both major U.S. political parties makes this paradigm dated. Shaping public policy is no longer a monopoly of government officials. Today, public policy is increasingly shaped by interest groups, by citizen activists from both the political left and right who pack legislators’ town hall meetings and drive public-private coalitions to advance both corporate and consumer interests. Federal dominance of policy-setting powers has also yielded more space to experimentation by the fifty diverse state governments, which act as what Justice Brandeis in an earlier era called the “laboratories of democracy.” Thus states can provide ever more space in which NGOs can have an impact.

NGOs today are increasingly viewed as an alternative means to for the *vox populi*, the voice of the people to be heard. Yet, in much of the recent U.S. public discourse, NGOs are subject to caricature. Many are portrayed as poorly managed, inadequately financed groups of passionate cause activists and litigious critics of government policy working on the political fringes. These portraits are misleading. They obscure the important role both conservative and liberal NGOs play in U. S. policymaking, as well as the growing sophistication of NGOs as they gain resources and micro-targeting capabilities, the ability to target individual supporters and potential supporters.

During the 1980s, when Reagan Administration officials sought to limit social services provided by the government safety net, more NGOs began to combine policy advocacy with service delivery. As NGO ranks matured through the Bush-Clinton-Bush presidencies, NGO leaders created—or were offered—seats at the table where policy is made. Indeed, some local and state governments and courts have increasingly stipulated a role in the decision-making process for NGOs.

This trend was checked by the Great Recession which followed the 2008 crash of the U.S. housing market and plummeting stock valuations. Discretionary funding from many U.S. NGO contributors dropped. At the same time, the expanding ranks of international NGOs was challenged by dictators from Vladimir Putin's Russia to Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China. Authoritarian regimes from Zimbabwe to Venezuela have come to view NGO leaders who press for an independent media or voting rights as threats to one party control. Egypt has imprisoned democracy activists from the U.S.-backed National Democratic Institute. Leaders of journalists' organizations have been murdered in Moscow and Putin's political opponents have been jailed. Chinese authorities have repeatedly arrested environmental activists from organizations as modest as local parent-teacher groups. A development especially ominous for NGOs has been the appearance of similar versions of anti-NGO legislation advanced by different regimes. Soon after such measures are adopted by one puppet legislature, similar moves are embraced by dictatorships in others. Some authoritarian regimes seek to co-opt citizen movements by creating their own NGOs to parrot government lines. Putin has even gone so far as to have his Duma back a taxpayer-financed office building to house regime-approved NGOs at the new government center being built in Moscow.

Obama, Trump and NGOs as Change Agents

The role NGOs will play in the future is certain to be vigorously contested. Citizen movements in this country have proved to be powerful forces for change during the first two decades of the 21st century. For example, Barack Obama and Donald Trump have remarkably different character traits and governance agendas. Their election as political novices running against the establishment of their party, however, gives them much in common. Similarities begin with the fact that they both astonished odds-makers and defeated Hillary Clinton, one from the left and one from the right. Both outsider campaigns found support from scattered citizen groups, including members of Moveon.org and the Tea Party. Both candidates ran as change agents, determined to shatter the political status quo. Both campaigns initially operated as a third force propelled by citizens who felt strongly that the U.S. government was headed in the wrong direction.

Twice in this new century these revolts succeeded. Citizen groups overcame their own party hierarchy, then defeated the incumbent party's seasoned insider candidate. Both campaigns invited greater grassroots activism and increased the power of citizen-led organizations to impact policy.

Consider the success of NGOs in altering the national policy agenda. The Tea Party, citizen groups such as Moveon.org opposing expansion of U.S. military missions in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, NGOs addressing challenges related to women's rights, gay marriage, gun policy, climate change, immigration, and marijuana law reforms have each won victories during the last decade. Citizens in other countries have also challenged their governments' policies using NGOs. From the Brexit campaign in the United Kingdom to the rise of environmental activism in China, their impact suggests the future may see greater power for NGOs in some nations, even as NGOs in others face repression from authoritarian regimes.

One of the most striking characteristics of our turbulent democracy is that governance in the United States is not the exclusive province of politicians and bureaucrats. It never has been. Even in the flawed founding of the United States—which offered voting powers only to a select group of white males—there was provision made for the right of citizens to petition for the redress of grievances. A central theme of the creators of American democracy was the insistence on shaping a government that was open to challenge from citizen groups.

Power was dispersed by design. The rights of free association and a free press were protected. Madison regretted the rise of factions in his essay *Federalist 10*. However, the Constitution sought to ensure the contest of ideas would occur on a relatively level playing field.

Today, the role of citizen groups, trade associations, and service organizations operating as independent policy forces is embedded in our national political system. With deep divisions apparent in the current electorate over the proper role of government, the role of NGOs will change as the appeal of grassroots populist forces of both the left and right grows. The many pressures on government institutions indicate that the status quo will be dramatically altered. Direct popular input will expand its impact on governance. The Hamiltonian vision of a select group of privileged “wise men” controlling government, an elite similar to that of Plato’s Republic, has been shattered.

Analyzing how the role of NGOs will evolve begins with study of the best practices. Last fall, two dozen MPP students at the University of Virginia’s Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy undertook a semester-long inquiry into what those NGOs who succeed most often have adopted as governance models. Review of the academic literature and interviews of top CEO leaders yields some clear takeaways. Following is a list of top ten skills some of the more effective NGOs engaged in advocacy in the U.S. currently employ:

1. Mission Discipline to Focus on Core Competencies

The most successful NGOs exercise the discipline to resist mission creep. They focus on those core competencies that anchor their contributions within a specific niche of policy debate and service delivery. They build and renew support for this mission with employees and donors.

2. Strategic Planning and Research

The best NGOs have an institutional capacity to look both backwards and into the future. They adopt lessons learned from previous campaigns, learning key precedents and adapting them to changed circumstances. They conduct targeted research on their role in the policy advocacy process. They cement relations with board leaders and engage members and staff in a thorough and transparent strategic planning process.

3. Internal, External and Crisis Communications

New media platforms have had a profound impact on recent American elections as well as the legislative process. NGO members have often been ahead of their (often older and less technologically adept) leadership. The ability of NGOs to mobilize voters and impact even opaque elements of the legislative process has grown. However, many NGOs suffer from weak internal communications. Their leadership can be unprepared when a ‘good’ organization pursuing ‘noble’ causes faces press scrutiny. Effective advance crisis planning, as well as the ability to engage both internal and external audiences in a timely fashion, can prove essential elements for success.

4. Board Relations and Succession Planning

NGOs benefit from agile leaders. Leaders who have freedom of action, yet who are fully accountable to an engaged board of directors, improve prospects for sustainable success. Leaders with solid intelligence on board factions and their concerns are less likely to be blindsided by internal disputes. Good NGOs leaders

avoid the dangers of “founder’s syndrome,” the debilitating notion that one individual alone is essential to the past, present, and future of the enterprise.

5. Development Benchmarks and Membership Ties

Mission-driven organizations require coordinated fundraising efforts. Ideological passion is no substitute for professional development programs with clear measures for progress. In sustainable organizations, ties to members are renewed through effective two-way communication, even as advocacy efforts and service delivery evolve.

6. Charismatic Leadership and Performance Metrics

NGOs often include activists not enamored of hierarchical management structures. Flat organizations emphasize the value of individual contributions. Volunteers and grassroots members can be force multipliers. However, no amount of cause-driven passion can long overcome management that lacks accountability or fails to adapt to changed circumstances. A critical element of success is often the adoption of clear metrics for measuring progress.

7. Human Resources and Legal Guidance

NGO leaders—especially in immature start-up organizations—can be afflicted by the illusion that unity in pursuing a cause can overcome a failure to adopt sound legal practices. Organizations that succeed over the long term combine the passion of issue-driven policy advocates with professional employee management. Lobbying laws are complex. They change often. Protection of the NGO enterprise requires solid human resources, tax, and accounting professionals. These individuals can prove especially important when niche organizations branch out to develop new revenue models as social entrepreneurs.

8. Coalition Building and Stakeholder Input

Civic activists are often driven by righteousness and moral clarity. However, the most effective NGOs demonstrate the value of knowing stakeholders and developing new allies. Creative bridge building can prove the key to winning and developing a sustainable model.

9. Shaping Organizational Culture

Effective NGO leaders are sensitive to the particular bureaucratic culture under which their organization thrives. Even closely linked advocacy groups and service organizations can have remarkably different ways of engaging external publics and internal teams. Leadership of effective NGOs often requires a keen sensitivity to structural weaknesses which can inhibit performance.

10. Recruiting Talented Team Members

NGOs leverage the passion of citizen activists and association members to advance public policy goals, goals often neglected by government. However, no amount of issue-driven advocacy can ensure success if the most important element of the enterprise is overlooked: the people who work there. Effective NGOs resemble a sound baseball team roster; the best deploy different players for roles where management believes they can excel. Recruitment and retention of skilled individuals in NGOs embodies the wisdom scholar Robert Bruner

has offered a generation of MBA students, his updating of an Aristotelean dictum on character, the notion that “talent is destiny” (Bruner, 2016).

Effective NGO leaders grasp and apply each of these lessons. Yet, much can go wrong in the area of motivation. Our research uncovered multiple examples where even the most well-intentioned NGO leaders were tempted to go astray and were subsequently beset by predictable dangers, from mission creep to founder’s syndrome to a failure to adopt best management practices. The organizations—and the causes they seek to advance—invariably suffer when a lack of discipline becomes apparent.

Conclusion: The Search for a “Secret Sauce”

The experience of interviewing leaders of top NGOs and studying academic literature on best practices reveals an unrelenting search for a “secret sauce,” that ingredient that can bring out the best in an NGO. This search will continue as the field of endeavor expands. In our chaotic democracy, NGOs are likely to evolve in fascinating ways. Niche players who set out originally to provide a specific local service may grow to undertake more broad issue advocacy. Some NGOs will conclude it is essential to seek a national, or even a *transnational*, impact.

Those NGO leaders involved in lobbying on behalf of a specific cause may increasingly choose to deliver some direct public services. The well-financed interests of stockholder-focused trade associations will continue to work through commercial and consumer groups to press their agendas. New modalities for financing NGOs are being developed, and social entrepreneurship models may secure exponentially greater resources to apply on behalf of an NGO’s mission. Some NGO supporters may embrace profit generation as key to sustaining service delivery and expanding policy impact.

The future of NGOs in the U.S. is promising. NGOs are similar to democracy; both contain the seeds for their own reinvention. If our French visitor Monsieur de Tocqueville returned to the United States to prepare a bicentennial review of his *Democracy in America*, much would surprise him. One can only imagine that what many contemporaries consider to be our most unusual political phenomena—whether a president making foreign policy by tweet, or a flash crowd summoned by social media to a White House protest—would *not* surprise Tocqueville. Both are manifestations of democracy in action. They feature citizens who form cause-driven associations and communicate their passions directly to government officials, or those who govern trying to stay close to the voters. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that while NGOs will continue to evolve in the United States, they will retain what has been their central mission since our nation’s founding—citizen engagement in the democratic process of shaping public policy.

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References

1. The author wishes to acknowledge valuable contributions from University Professor and former Dean of UVa’s Darden School of Business Robert Bruner and Batten School Professor Kirsten Gelsdorf, as well as graduate assistants Lauren Russell, Sumedha Deshmukh, Alexander Nance, Kelly Kaler, Danielle Childress

and Alexandra Hanway. The concepts developed in this essay also benefitted from the analysis of two dozen Batten School MPP students who animated the Fall 2016 UVa seminar PPOL 5350, Best Practices for NGO Leaders. Participants interviewed more than a dozen leaders of top NGOs, from Michael Needham of Heritage Action to Billy Shore of Share Our Strength/No Kid Hungry, from Ken Wollack of the National Democratic Institute to Gabe Metcalf and Jennifer Warburg of SPUR, a national thought leader on urban policy based in the San Francisco Bay Area.

2. "From 2003 to 2013, the number of nonprofit organizations registered with the IRS rose from 1.38 million to 1.41 million... These organizations comprise a diverse range of nonprofits, including art, health, education, and advocacy nonprofits; labor unions; and business and professional associations." Urban Institute, [The Nonprofit Sector in Brief: Public Charities, Giving, and Volunteering](#) (October 29, 2015) See also: US State Department, [Fact Sheet on Non-Governmental Organizations in the United States](#) (January 20, 2017) "Approximately 1.5 million NGOs operate in the United States. These NGOs undertake a wide array of activities, including political advocacy on issues such as foreign policy, elections, the environment, healthcare, women's rights, economic development, and many other issues."

3. The three texts that provided the most comprehensive foundation for this inquiry include Crutchfield, L. R., & Grant, H. M. (2008). *Forces for good: The six practices of high-impact nonprofits*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass; Oster, S. M. (1995). *Strategic management for nonprofit organizations: Theory and cases*. New York: Oxford University Press; and Worth, M. J. (2017). *Nonprofit management: Principles and practice, 4th edition*. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications. The seminal essay exploring the growth of NGOs working on transnational issues remains Jessica Tuchman Mathews' "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs* #76 (1997). The best analyses of the changing management approaches to leading NGOs in the U.S. can be found in the *Stanford Social Innovation Review*. For a thoughtful bibliographic essay on NGO best practices, see Chad Vickers' chapter in the Batten School's 2017 compilation of case studies, [Best Practices for NGO Leaders](#).

4. "Of the 8,632 AY 2013-2014 graduates from 194 programs, 36 percent were employed within 6 months of graduation across all levels of government, 20 percent in the nonprofit sector, 15 percent in the private sector, and another 3 percent were seeking further education." NASPAA, [2014-2015 Data Report](#) (October 18, 2016).

5. Presentation of University Professor and former Dean of the Darden School of Business Robert Bruner, at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, October 19, 2016

Policy Analysis in Journalism: How to Use the Policy Memo Framework in Television News Reporting

By Nora Neus, M.P.P.

Joy Twisdale was nervous. She wasn't so sure about me.

We were sitting in her son Thomas's addiction counselor's office at the Valley Community Services Board in Staunton, Virginia—an office she had not seen much since Thomas died in a single car accident in the middle of the night, when police believe he was going to buy drugs. My photographer quietly set up the gear, and I tried to make her feel comfortable. It had taken about a month of phone calls and weeks of waiting for her to decide to come to the interview.

"I'm doing this for Thomas," she said suddenly, with a slight smile.

"What would he think of all this?" I asked, gesturing at the massive television camera, the lights blinding her, the microphone we threaded up her shirt.

She laughed then, breaking into a wide smile for the first time.

"He'd be like, 'alright mom!'" She flashed two big thumbs up.

* * *

Before I started working as a journalist, I thought I would be a policy analyst for the federal government. I received my Master of Public Policy degree from the University of Virginia after spending two years writing policy memos analyzing the depth of current policy problems and proposing a multitude of solutions. When my career veered into local news, I put my wonky interests on hold.

But almost a year into my position as an on-air reporter at WVIR NBC29, I started hearing more and more about the nationwide opioid addiction epidemic. During the summer of 2016, media attention to the topic in national outlets grew. On the local level, we were also seeing more opioid and heroin overdose deaths in Central Virginia (see sources).

Working weekend nights does not help your social life, but it does put you at the front of the crime beat, where you can meet helpful sources. That July and August, I started calling my contacts at local rescue squads and police departments to get an idea of what they were seeing. From these men and women, I learned that, while we had not heard much about opioid addiction in our Central Virginia community, it was very much the topic of conversation behind closed doors at the fire station, hospital emergency department, and school counselors' offices.

I spent the next three months interviewing first responders, medical professionals and researchers, police officers, and addiction counselors. It was one of those counselors, Andrea Kendall, who suggested I speak to Joy Twisdale.

Sitting in Kendall's office under the glare of LED lights, Twisdale recounted how Thomas' normal childhood of basketball and video games in a small town called Stuarts Draft in the Shenandoah Valley

turned into an adolescence of sneaking drugs and getting high.

“The whole time he was doing, he, he’d say, ‘Mom, I don’t know why I can’t stop,’ and he was very emotional,” Twisdale told me once we started the interview, looking at her hands in her lap. “I took parenting classes for difficult children, and I was *trying* to help him.” That help came in many forms. Friends like Debbie Healey, who patiently sat next to Twisdale during her 45-minute interview, placing a comforting hand on her shoulder at points, supported the family—and especially Joy—while Thomas was using. Thomas started seeing addiction counselor Andrea Kendall as part of a court-ordered arrangement after he became addicted to opioids and then progressed to harder drugs and intravenous use.

Kendall was more at ease under the glare of the TV lights, but clearly she was attached to this family and its story. Thomas was “very intelligent, very bright, articulate,” she said, swiveling back and forth on her desk chair, “and I admit that even I did not realize the extent of his drug use at first.” In counseling, Thomas made it seem as though he took opioids every so often, and seldom harder drugs. But over time, he let that veil fall and began to be honest with Kendall, who was able to share these details of confidential sessions with the permission of Joy Twisdale. Kendall told me how Thomas would admit he woke up with only one goal: to get as high as possible. He told her he would think, “I just want to be numb, I don’t want to think, I don’t want to function.”

After a stint in an adolescent-focused in-patient rehab center in Northern Virginia, Thomas was living back at home in April 2015. One night, Thomas snuck out of the home at 2 a.m., in a car he wasn’t allowed to drive, to buy drugs. Police say he died on impact when he was thrown from the vehicle. Officers knocked on Joy’s door around 4 a.m.

“They said, ‘Your son was in a single car accident, and he didn’t make it.’ And I just... my body turned to jelly, and I just collapsed to the floor, and just started crying, ‘not my baby, please God, not my baby.’”

Thomas Twisdale may have been the center of my story, but I knew he was not the only Central Virginian addicted to opioids who progressed to other drugs and died as an indirect result of drug use, if not a direct overdose death. I needed to use his story as a starting point to showcase the depth of the problem across the region. After spending two years in graduate school hammering out policy memo after policy memo, the format came naturally to me: background, scope of the problem, options, and recommendation.

A typical television news story, called a “package” in broadcast parlance, is between a minute and twenty seconds and two minutes. For a longer investigative story like this, my producers told me I had time up to a few minutes, but I knew I would have to tell the story in two parts to make room for the details I knew were important. It seemed natural to focus the first part on the scope of the problem and the second on potential solutions from experts in the community.

Part one of my report told the Twisdale family story and provided context within the larger epidemic. I used statistics from the Department of Health and Human Services to show that in 2014, the last year with reliable data, more than 1,700 young adults died from prescription death overdoses, a four-fold increase since 1999 (HHS, 2014). I interviewed first responders and healthcare providers in the region, one of whom told me, in no uncertain terms, “In this region, this is an epidemic. This is the real deal” (Joyce, 2017). Part two, subtitled “What We Can Do,” highlighted three solutions from three stakeholder groups: reduce (health care providers can prescribe fewer legal opioids to reduce amount in circulation), dispose (community members and family can clean out medicine cabinets), and treat (the criminal justice system can prioritize treating drug

abusers instead of, or in addition to, incarcerating them).

My final story, “Drugs in Virginia: Opioid Addiction,” aired on December 8 and 9, 2016. That night, a producer who had not worked on the story pulled me aside, impressed, and said, “That was such an innovative way of structuring the report.” I laughed and offhandedly said, “No, I promise it wasn’t, it was just a policy memo turned into television.” But in that moment, I realized he was completely right; I had just presented what was essentially a policy memo in a local news format. As if by muscle memory, in order to present a complicated policy topic to a relatively uninformed set of viewers, my instincts went to the tried and true policy memo framework.

Policy makers in the community responded quickly to the story. Albemarle County Commonwealth’s Attorney Robert Tracci called me the day after the story aired to announce that he was starting a taskforce with area health providers to target the epidemic, based on my reporting. In an open letter to the administrators of the University of Virginia Health System and Sentara Martha Jefferson Hospital, he wrote that our NBC29 investigation “cast additional light on the scope and prevalence of this epidemic in Central Virginia” (Tracci, 2016).

While I did not set out to structure this report as a policy memo, a format seldom—if ever—used for local television news packages, the format worked perfectly to accomplish my goal: to highlight a “hidden” problem in the community that we, in the local media, had not dug into yet, and spur actual change in the real world.

In policy school, I worried my curriculum and policy analysis skill development would only apply to my future career if I decided to pursue a bureaucratic job. Through reporting this story, I discovered the skills of policy analysis can—and should—be applied to fields beyond in-house government policy analysis to add substance and grit to news reports at all levels, local and beyond.

Nora Neus is an on-air reporter for WVIR NBC29 in Charlottesville, Virginia, covering primarily local government and public policy. She holds a Master of Public Policy degree from the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy and is currently working toward an M.A. in War Studies through the distance learning program at King’s College London.

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The Conservative Case for a Universal Basic Income

By Herman Mark Schwartz

The United States should begin phasing in a universal basic income (UBI), or an equivalent negative income tax, in order to preempt the likely negative consequences of continued development of artificial intelligence and automation. Those consequences are decreasing social cohesion, anomie subsequent to lost purpose in life, and the work disincentivizing effects of the current system of social protection. These threaten the long-run political stability of the United States.

People focused on pension stability fear a future of acute labor shortages stemming from low fertility in the past two decades, but this problem is self-equilibrating. If labor actually is in short supply, either wages will rise, drawing retirees and young people back into the labor force, or they will spur more automation, exacerbating the existing trend towards labor shedding. That labor shedding is a much greater certainty than labor shortages.

Let's start with the money -- because that's what this issue is all about. Currently, a worker on minimum wage, if she works a full 2000 hour work-year -- and with minimum wage workers that is a big if -- will net about \$13,400 after Social Security and Medicaid taxes. But because employers pay the other half of those taxes, she costs the employer about \$15,600 in direct wage costs. Easily programmable robots already in the market, like Rethink Robotics Baxter® manufacturing robot, cost \$25,000 for the most basic unit. A few useful options might push the price to \$30,000. Looking at those numbers, you might think the human is still cheaper. But Baxter-type robots can work two 8 hour shifts without complaint or overtime, never call in sick for work, are free from substance abuse, don't file lawsuits, don't ask for raises, and have more easily upgradable software. On that account, Baxter is already cheaper, and, in effect, free after the first year.

The employment effects of automation (and de-unionization) are already being felt in the form of stagnant wages and a falling employment to population ratio (a better measure of national work effort than the unemployment rate). In turn, the loss of meaningful, well-compensated work has created a wide range of social problems. It's no accident that opioid addiction and deaths are highest in areas where work, and especially manufacturing work, has disappeared. Similarly, life expectancy is falling for white women and stagnant for white males in those same locales. These are the individual level manifestations of anomie and social dislocation. But that individually experienced anomie also aggregates into nihilistic politics that threaten the stability of the Republic by encouraging a 'burn it all down' mentality. Fritz Lang captured this phenomenon brilliantly in his 1927 film *Metropolis*, when the worker rebellion destroys the pumps protecting workers' underground city (and elites' dwellings above) from flooding.

A universal basic income -- a minimum payment possibly free of any work requirement -- would enable people to regain some stability in their lives by assuring them a constant income, and it would encourage families to stay together. If this income were pegged at a generous \$10,000 per person (which would still leave a family of four at only 66% of the median family income, and a household of two at 40% of the median household income) it would cost the United States approximately 18% of current GDP. That seems like an insurmountable amount of money. But a UBI would also eliminate virtually all of the bureaucracy currently administering the myriad of complex and inconsistent federal, state and local welfare programs; it would permit a scaling back of Social Security; and higher income individuals would necessarily return part or all of their UBI as taxes.

Finally, a UBI would necessarily have to be paired with some form of universal health insurance, and this would allow the United States to shrink its outrageously high and notoriously inefficient health care costs (which are also an overt and covert tax). Simply reducing health expenditures to the level of Switzerland or Japan would free up six to seven percentage points of GDP for redeployment to a UBI.

A UBI would undoubtedly induce some people to drop out of the labor force, content to live on a minimal income. But, frankly, most of these individuals are zero or negative marginal productivity workers anyway. The rest would not face the punishingly high marginal rates of taxation that current targeted benefits create, and would have the incentive of being able to seek more meaningful work, or the ability to try to start their own firms. This would create a healthier, happier body politic.

Herman Mark Schwartz is a professor in the Politics Department of the University of Virginia. He is author or co-editor of seven books and numerous articles and chapters. He has taught in numerous foreign countries, including Britain, Canada, Denmark, Korea, Norway, and Batten. His current research looks at how recent changes in corporate strategy and structure are producing slow growth and income inequality.

Closing the Divide: President Trump's Maternal Leave Policy and the "Highest, Hardest" Glass Ceiling

By Anna Troutman

"I know we have still not shattered that highest and hardest glass ceiling, but some day someone will and hopefully sooner than we might think right now," Hillary Clinton said in her November 2016 concession speech, days after her opponent, Republican Donald Trump, pulled off a shocking electoral victory. As I watched Secretary Clinton, the first female candidate nominated by a major party for president of the United States, give her speech, I was hopeful, but overwhelmingly skeptical, that her message would ring true. Existing gender divides in the U.S. are larger than ever. The anti-women rhetoric of our President became a late-night comedy punch line during the campaign. I found myself wondering what effect this presidency would have on the prospect of another competitive female presidential candidate. Could this administration possibly promote policies that would clear the way for the next Hillary Clinton?

It is no secret that women and men in the U.S. workforce face an economic divide. According to the World Economic Forum, the U.S. saw only 75.2 percent female to male economic participation in 2016 (World Economic Forum, 2016). Although Western Europe also has a 25 percent gap between equal opportunities for men and women, their gap has gradually narrowed, while North America lags three percentage points behind and has stagnated in closing that distance (World Economic Forum, 2016). The unequal burden of childbearing is unmistakably a contributor to this divide; gender discrepancies reliably appear in the workforce when workers reach childbearing age.

Lack of legislated maternity leave is the low-hanging fruit of policy problems among the many factors limiting women's workforce mobility. The U.S. is one of only two countries (and the only developed nation) that does not have, at minimum, legally-protected, partially-paid leave for postnatal working women (Suddath, 2015). Studies have shown that maternity leave is closely correlated with female economic participation: countries with longer fully-paid maternity leave have a higher percentage of women participating in their workforce. Paid leave increases female long-term earning potential and improves the overall economic health of the nation (U.S. Department of Labor, 2016).

Federally protected maternity leave in the U.S. is restricted to the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), which is limited in scope. FMLA requires only companies with 50 or more employees to provide up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave to new mothers and guarantee a job upon return. Employees must satisfy numerous qualifications to be eligible, including employment at that company for at least twelve months and a minimum of 1,250 hours worked during that year (FMLA, 2016).

Fully inclusive solutions to paid parental leave are challenging to find. In the last decade, robust paid maternity leave policies have been pioneered on the state level in California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island (U.S. Department of Labor, 2016). But gaps in coverage persist and disproportionately affect the most vulnerable working women: single mothers and women at low income levels who cannot afford to lose hours. Employer-based paid maternity leave programs are rare; many companies find the policies prohibitively expensive, and fear that costs will be compounded by the risk of losing employees to motherhood. A federally mandated paid parental leave policy remains, by far, the most effective solution.

President Trump put forward a federal maternal leave policy in his September 2016 campaign speech in Aston, Pennsylvania. He articulated a childcare policy built around six weeks of partially paid maternity leave for working mothers. This benefit would extend existing unemployment insurance already provided by companies, creating no new cost to employers – all expenses would be paid by offsetting reductions in the program (Trump Campaign, 2016).

President Trump’s proposed policy shares many aspects with other successful paid maternal leave policies. In particular, it is strikingly similar to a piece of legislation that stagnated in the U.S. Senate in 2013. Senator Kristen Gillibrand’s (D-NY) proposed solution would have mandated employers to offer new parents 12 weeks of paid leave at 66 percent of their salary; this leave would be financed through existing channels of insurance (Suddath, 2015). The bill has been quietly ignored by the Senate Finance Committee since its introduction.

Here, President Trump has been presented with a unique opportunity. Investing in children is one of the few issues on which Democrats and Republicans unreservedly agree. With a Democrat-sponsored bill proposing a nearly identical framework for maternal leave as his own suggested policy, Trump has a low-risk opening to reach across the partisan divide and cooperate on an issue with lasting impact. Though Trump’s proposed policy leaves much to be desired – it has no provisions for paternal leave or adoptive parental leave, recognizing only a limited family structure – it is a first step for which America is long overdue.

A day after watching Secretary Clinton speak, I took the time to listen to President-Elect Trump’s victory address. “As I’ve said from the beginning,” he shared, “ours was not a campaign, but an incredible and great movement made up of millions of hard-working men and women who love their country and want a better, brighter future for themselves and their families” (“Transcript: Donald Trump’s,” 2016). If President Trump propels his movement forward by supporting working mothers through bipartisan channels, the best of his campaign promises will begin to ring true. America will continue to be great. He may even help achieve what Secretary Clinton had hoped to do: to shatter the “highest, hardest” glass ceiling sooner than we think.

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Undocumented Virginians in the Age of Trump

By Jessica F. Chilin-Hernández

Following the election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States, the largest immigrant youth-led organization in the United States, United We Dream (UWD), declared a “state of urgency and resilience” for immigrant communities nationwide. Over the next few weeks, UWD organized a series of community calls to promote advocacy, know-your rights information, mental health, and suicide prevention. These initiatives — the latter two in particular — are symptoms of the fearful and anxious sentiments reverberating throughout immigrant communities as they contemplate their future under a Trump Administration.

It is crucial for states and cities to put forth resources to protect, advocate, and support their immigrant populations. While our federal system currently does not provide a straightforward path for undocumented people to become U.S. citizens, our tax system provides an infrastructure for all immigrants to contribute tax revenue to state and local economies. It is only fair that state legislators give some consideration to their respective immigrant populations by removing barriers that prevent undocumented people from fully participating in their communities. A specific group of undocumented Virginians faces such a barrier: college-bound high school students also known as DREAMers (American Immigration Council, 2012).

Opponents of removing barriers that prevent undocumented students from accessing higher education argue that granting them in-state tuition is unfair to U.S. citizens. This argument generally rests on three assumptions: 1) undocumented people are unworthy of taxpayer-funded services; 2) undocumented people bring crime to our communities; and 3) undocumented students do not deserve in-state tuition because their presence in the state is unlawful. None of these assumptions hold up well under close scrutiny.

The first assumption conveniently dismisses undocumented Virginians’ tax contributions to the state economy. It is estimated that undocumented immigrants pay between \$51.9 million and \$67.1 million in property taxes, and between \$105.8 million and \$135.4 million in sales and excise taxes per year in Virginia (Williams & Cassidy, 2016). Nationally, undocumented immigrants collectively pay \$11.64 billion in state and local taxes annually (Gee, Gardner and Wiehe 2016). Certainly, any legislation or policy that seeks to address the conditions experienced by undocumented people must take into account that they are taxpayers as well.

The second assumption ignores the overwhelming evidence to the contrary: immigrants neither cause nor aggravate criminal activity in the United States. First, compared to U.S.-born American citizens, documented and undocumented immigrants are less likely to commit serious crimes or be behind bars regardless of nationality or level of education (Ewing, Martínez, and Rumbaut 2015). Immigrants are also less likely than U.S.-born American citizens to engage in criminal behaviors such as being repeat offenders, assaulting another person, or theft (Ewing, Martínez, and Rumbaut 2015). Moreover, lower rates of violent crime and property crime are actually associated with high rates of immigration (American Civil Liberties Union, 2008). Disproved time and time again by a number of studies, the link between high levels of immigration and high levels of crime is false.

In addition to ignoring U.S. immigration history and current laws in place, the third assumption is based on a harsh social judgment of undocumented people that holds them in contempt for not applying for legal authorization prior to entry to the U.S. In our current immigration system, there is neither a readily available

pathway to legal status, nor an infrastructure in place to “get in line” (American Immigration Council, 2015). Furthermore, 40 percent of the 11 million undocumented immigrants currently residing in the U.S. legally entered on tourist, student and temporary worker visas, which means that they were subject to inspection by immigration officials before entering the country (Murra, 2016). Many people legally entered the country they now call home, but once here, could not simply adjust their status to a legal one. Because immigration laws are designed to make U.S. entry and reentry difficult for non-European immigrants (Chomsky, 2014, p. 85), many individuals overstay their visas past their designated time frame. Once visas expire, legal immigrants fall out of status and become undocumented.

The decision to migrate cannot be divorced from the impact that U.S. foreign policy has had on immigrants’ countries of birth, many of whom are from Third World nations. For the purposes of this article, I will focus the Central American nation of El Salvador. Gonzales (2000, p. 129) states that it was not until the final decades of the twentieth century that Central Americans started to have a significant presence in the United States. Their immigration was the direct result of American military intervention in the region. In the case of El Salvador, where over 75,000 Salvadorans perished during the civil war, the United States provided \$3.7 million to the Salvadoran government. Seventy percent of this aid financed weapons and military assistance. According to the United Nations Truth Commission’s report on the conflict, an estimated 85 percent of the violence was perpetrated by U.S. financially supported government paramilitaries, death squads, and army units (Bonner, 2016). Indeed, we cannot discuss immigration without mentioning foreign policies that have systematically destabilized societies and economies, of which the only realistic option to survive is migration.

Virginia DREAMers are no different from their U.S. citizen counterparts. They are honor roll students, and they are young leaders who volunteer in our local communities through leadership and service. They dream of attending our state’s best public institutions to obtain a world-class education while remaining close to home. Along with their families, DREAMers are active participants in the state economy by virtue of being consumers. They follow the laws, and they pay taxes. In turn, the Virginia state legislature should provide them with the opportunity to complete their postsecondary studies.

Fortunately, some Virginia leaders understand the justice and prudence of this approach. In 2014, Attorney General Mark Herring announced that undocumented students in Virginia could qualify for in-state tuition provided they were covered by Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) (Herring 2014). Created by President Barack Obama on June 15, 2012, DACA allowed administrative relief from deportation for eligible immigrant youth who migrated to the U.S. as children (National Immigration Law Center, 2016). It also equipped them with a work permit that authorized their legal employment in the United States. DACA opened many doors of freedom for undocumented youth nationwide. It also presented states the legal space to embrace equity-based policy to support DACA documented (DACAmended) residents.

However, that was 2014. Four anti-student immigrant bills have since been introduced to the Virginia General Assembly: HB 1356 and SB 722 in 2015, and HB 2001 and HB 2004 in 2017. HB 1356 and SB 722 would have outlawed the option for public institutions of higher education to grant in-state tuition to undocumented Virginians. Specifically, HB 1356 would have made any DACA recipient ineligible for Virginia domicile, therefore making them ineligible for in-state tuition billing at public institutions of higher education (HB 1356, 2015). SB 722 went further, excluding both DACA recipients and beneficiaries of the Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA), the new deferred action program announced by President Obama on November 20, 2014 (SB 722, 2015). Fast forward to 2017: anti-immigrant bills continue being introduced to the General Assembly. HB 2001 would have required college and university

administrators to cooperate and comply in the enforcement of federal law by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on campus, non-campus and public property (HB 2001, 2017). HB 2004 would have forced university campus governing boards to annually report how many non-citizen students are enrolled full time, and how many of those students receive financial assistance to attend those institutions (HB 2004, 2017).

The latter two bills were introduced ten days before the inauguration of President Trump. They have since met opposition from students, advocates, and educators alike. Through community-led lobbying, the Education Subcommittee struck SB 2004 from the docket and unanimously laid SB 2001 on the table by voice vote on January 31, 2017. This was exactly a week after President Trump signed executive orders ordering the construction of his campaign-promised wall along the U.S.-Mexico border, and the cutting of federal funding to sanctuary cities (Federal Register, 2017, Executive Orders 13767 & 13768).

Although this was an encouraging sign, the obstacles that confront undocumented Virginians remain. A pro-immigrant bill that would have provided in-state tuition for DACAmented students, even in the event of a DACA repeal, was tabled in the full Education committee of the House of Delegates on February 1, 2017 (HB 1857, 2017). And an anti-sanctuary law prohibiting localities from adopting ordinances restricting federal immigration law enforcement was passed 63-yes to 33-no on February 7, 2017 by the House of Delegates (HB 2000, 2017).

Anti-immigrant bills do not move the Commonwealth forward. In the case of HB 2001 and HB 2004, not only do these policies make college campuses zones of immigration enforcement that put students at risk, but they also dissuade many from pursuing a college education by fomenting environments of fear and anxiety at colleges across the state. For each undocumented student who is not able to complete their post-secondary education, Virginia loses human capital one human at a time: lawyers, teachers, doctors, professors, bankers, organizers, artists, journalists, writers, nurses, and scholars who will not be. Barring undocumented students from tapping into their academic potential is synonymous to depriving the Commonwealth of talent, which it could use to propel the state economy forward.

It is true that state legislators have only limited power and authority to pass laws that will improve the lot of undocumented people. However, it is within the power of the Virginia legislature to pursue policies that provide opportunities for its taxpayers. It is fiscally inconceivable to divorce Virginia's ability to provide services to all constituents from the annual tax contributions of undocumented immigrants. Cassidy and Williams (2016) estimate that undocumented Virginians pay \$200.2 million and \$304.3 million in sales and excise taxes, local property taxes, and state income taxes into the local and Virginia state economy annually. The Commonwealth should embrace policies that ensure equity for all Virginian taxpayers regardless of immigration status.

Shortly after releasing his letter to the public, Attorney General Herring emphasized the undeniable identity of undocumented people in the Commonwealth as Virginians. "These 'DREAMers' are already Virginians in some very important ways. In most cases they were raised here, they graduated from Virginia schools, and they have known no home but Virginia" (Herring 2014). Indeed, the human condition and experience cannot be reduced to legalistic terms. Doing so opens the door to systemic injustice and dismissal of human rights. In the end, no human being is illegal, and immigrants hailing from other nations in the globalized world are no less lacking in humanity than those born in Virginia. Their unalienable humanity is ultimately the foundation of undocumented immigrants' right to equity and access to social mobility – a right they satisfy by contributing to Virginia's tax base and by executing their civic and neighborly duties in good faith.

Unfortunately, after a decade of failed efforts to reform US immigration laws, those laws are *still* imagined by many to be both rigid and incapable of change. But history shows us that immigration laws have repeatedly been subject to reform, revision, and amendment. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924, and the Bracero Agreement of 1942 all blocked the way toward full citizenship for some groups under the guise of limiting immigrant influence in the United States. In time, each of these laws came to be seen as oppressive, and were scrapped for more just and humane alternatives. Washington might not be ready to replace the broken immigration laws that currently prevail. But, that need not hold back Virginia. Promoting the wellbeing of undocumented immigrants is fundamental to promoting the prosperity of all Virginians. The Commonwealth can help pave the way forward by crafting policies that embrace undocumented residents and harness their talents for the common good.

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Women, Water, and a Way Forward

By Michelle Cho, M.P.P.

The Global Recognition of Women and Water

On March 8, 2017, the U.S. and many other nations celebrated “International Women’s Day.” On this momentous holiday, women, girls, and allies all over the world rallied together in pursuit of a future in which all can experience gender parity in political, economic, and social spheres. Champions of women’s achievements celebrated women’s advancement, campaigned against violence, and challenged bias and inequality (International Women’s Day, 2016).

Two weeks later, another cadre of advocates came together for World Water Day, a day organized by the United Nations to raise awareness of lingering global water needs. In light of heightened water scarcity, which is spurred by deficient utilities management, aging and derelict infrastructure, turmoil in the political world order, and early manifestations of the effects of climate change, water—the world’s single most important natural resource—became the focal point of discussion on March 22. This year’s theme of wastewater propelled the conversation of how to responsibly, sustainably, and cost-effectively manage wastewater to preserve local environments from degradation accelerated by inadequate resource management.

Women and water—elevated on the global stage during the same month—have the potential to radically improve the lives of millions around the world. Advocates should keep this in mind, and strategically promote these issues in tandem. After all, on the one hand, women compose roughly half of the world’s population, and as popularized by Nick Kristoff, “hold up half the sky” (WuDunn and Kristoff, 2009). They represent an entire demographic of people that has been under-utilized and under-leveraged for generations in every nation and continent throughout history. For both cultural and biological reasons, women have been cast aside, despite their tried and tested talent in tackling challenges under the duress of economic and resource scarcity.

Water—like women—also plays an omnipresent role in communities. Universal to life and key to alleviating global poverty, water touches nearly every aspect of human existence. Drinking water, hygiene, sanitation, agriculture and livestock, wastewater, energy—each of these sectors and industries depend on water to provide for robust and salubrious societies. Water is at least tangentially involved in every part of daily life and is needed to grow and cook food, to clean and bathe bodies, and to safely eliminate disease-incubating bacteria away from homes. The availability of water drives economies, cultivates healthy populations, and is essential in stewarding our environment for future generations.

The nexus of women and water could not be more consequential today. Every hour, 70 women and girls die from diseases brought about from a lack of access to sanitation and water (Unilever, 2013). As global water scarcity—a state where water consumption is twice as high as available supply—becomes more of a visceral reality, the need for more effective water strategy is paramount. With 40 percent of the world’s population already living in highly water stressed areas, and an estimated 1.8 billion people experiencing absolute water scarcity by 2025, a refocus of the global development agenda to both water and gender is crucial in building prosperous and flourishing communities (UN Water, n.d.; Few Resources, 2016).

When a paucity of resources is added to the compounding effects of sexism and misogyny, the resulting outputs demonstrate that water scarcity affects women in particularly different ways than it affects men. When it comes to water, by any metric, femaleness is almost guaranteed to be associated with greater burdens than maleness (United Nations Office of Disaster Risk Reduction). Whether it is measured in the form of time used to gather water in Sub-Saharan Africa, or the number of sexual attacks or advances experienced on the way to a public latrine in Nicaragua, or even by the number of girls who do not attend school due to menstruation in India, being a female in an impoverished community with poor utilities infrastructure has incredibly taxing consequences.

In today's political environment, development policymakers will need to generate, low-cost, evidence-driven ideas to improve policy in the face of having to do more good with fewer dollars. With the to-be-determined impacts of a new "America First" foreign policy promised by President Trump, the uncertain future of U.S. humanitarian aid could stifle the momentum driving WASH (Water, Hygiene, and Sanitation) advancements. In the face of trends indicating decreased overall aid to WASH programs in the past few years, gender-sensitive policy could provide more effective, enduring results that better capitalize on women's knowledge as key players in resource management (McClenaghan 2013).

What if smart public policy could effectively address both lingering gender inequality and predicted future water scarcity? While the intersectionality between gender and water is no novel revelation to development policy experts, the potential of one in improving the quality of the other remains promising. When potable water is made accessible and affordable, women and girls have the most to gain. They will be released from the confining limitations of water-insecure communities, such as wasted time gathering water, fear of violence, and taboo against menstruation. Establishing stable WASH can help ameliorate the disproportionately gendered effects and externalities brought on by water insecurity that is primarily borne on the shoulders of women and girls.

This article outlines the intersectionality of women and WASH, and outlines two low-cost, policy add-ons that can improve the return on donor organization investments in water. In expediting the pace by which progress is made in building water-resilient cities and towns that are more gender-inclusive, donor organizations and policymakers alike should implement two low-cost methods to leverage the strategic role that women can play in water: user-centered design and behavioral "nudges". Both of these practical, policy considerations can be enacted to increase the adoptability of WASH practices and water conservation efforts. These policy design components can also strategically target and capitalize on women as a change-making force, powerful in shaping social and micro-behavior within their communities.

WASH

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene includes programming surrounding safe drinking water, basic toilets/latrines, and the promotion of good hygiene habits such as handwashing (UNICEF, 2016). WASH is among the top development policy priorities of donor organizations like the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), because access to water is considered a universal human right.

The global ecosystem of development actors codified their commitment to securing improved water sources for all by establishing it in 2015 as Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) number six, the target that directly follows SDG number five, gender equality (United Nations, n.d.). Many WASH programs are executed at the household or school level, both domains where women traditionally maintain primary influence. Successful

programs have integrated environment-aware components to help eradicate or at least lessen social and cultural taboos around topics such as defecation, menstruation, and other hygiene practices.

Incorporating User-Centered Design

When it comes to water, women are key players who have often gone under-appreciated and under-leveraged. Policy interventions can be improved by actively working with women through principles of user-centered design (UCD). UCD is a process that intentionally incorporates the insights and needs of the end-user in designing a product or service. UCD capitalizes on the fundamental (but often forgotten) precept of working with end-consumers and everyday experts to design, create, and produce goods and services. In the water sector, UCD can be used to improve utilities delivery and consumption behavior from the “bottom-up.”

In most countries - both industrialized and developed - women are essentially water managers, understanding a community’s water needs intimately and with great personal familiarity. Women are an invaluable pool of tactical water knowledge, as they purchase, manage, and allocate water for their spouses, children, and elderly parents or in-laws. They therefore are the best populations to interact with to understand user needs.

Practicing UCD first requires that more female voices are brought to the decision-making table. In a local study conducted in South Africa, researchers found that, at community meetings addressing the absence or shortage of toilets and their proper maintenance, the majority of attendees were most often men (Mahon and Fernandes, 2010). Inviting more women to community gatherings might seem like a straightforward solution, but societal expectations about leadership and who is traditionally offered a voice in the collective decision-making process often make matters cumbersome for women who seek find a seat in these meetings. Field organizers and local governments should work on improving communications to empower women to take ownership of issues that they are the most knowledgeable about. This could be conducted by flyering through villages, contacting influential leaders to garner local buzz about open meetings, or through simple word-of-mouth campaigns geared at specific audiences and niches.

Organizers should aim to create safe and hospitable environments where women feel more welcome to speak up, such as having sessions facilitated by other women or allowing children to join meetings. This may also require arranging meetings at certain times and places that accommodate women’s schedules, such as avoiding dinner times when women are traditionally expected to be at home with family.

Once the right users are brought together, user-centered design is an excellent way of mitigating risk for investors, as integrating consumer feedback can predict and prevent issues down the road. A great example of a well-intentioned project implemented haphazardly due to missing understanding of cultural norms is FemCare (of the American brand Procter & Gamble). The company decided to distribute free menstrual pads in Africa, but ran into “unexpected challenges” when they realized they did not take into consideration the cultural taboo about blood and how to dispose of used sanitary products properly (WuDunn and Kristoff 2009). Communities resisted throwing out used pads in the garbage as done in the West, and even called for incinerators to burn the pads in certain places (Ibid).

The FemCare story is one that WASH advocates can learn from to avoid replicating failed policy in the future. Clearly and openly articulating concern for young menstruating girls—and taking concerted moves to graft their feedback into the development process—is imperative as the development community moves forward to engineer solutions that actually work for local adoption. For example, hosting engineering sessions with women to learn about their specific menstruation needs and cultural perceptions around blood

should be taken into consideration. In building facilities in communities that are amenable to these concerns, integrating feminine hygiene products should be the new normal. Transforming voiced concerns into practical implications for the design of toilets, latrines, and disposal options for pads and tampons in buildings can prevent misunderstandings and reduce the probability of failed interventions or lost capital in the future.

Beyond this example, the WASH sector could apply UCD in a number of water-related components such as engineering faucets and water access points, developing irrigation patterns and agricultural tools, and furnishing homes with individual or communal lavatories. UCD could also be used to design water storage units and inform city planning efforts to install piping and sewage systems.

WASH practices can take years of acclimation in some communities before becoming an unquestioned reality. UCD is a productive method of improving the likelihood of success, since users are designing the products they want to use for themselves. UCD is low-cost, and usually only requires limited funding for local volunteers to facilitate learning sessions between women and the donor firms or companies seeking to introduce new tools or infrastructure. It also can be added-on to scalable projects implemented in new environments, ensuring that community-specific sensitivities are addressed when a tested solution is implemented elsewhere.

Encouraging Behavioral “Nudges”

In conjunction with UCD, policymakers have a prime opportunity to pick other “low-hanging” fruit by incorporating behavioral insights into the design of WASH interventions. Coined by behavioral economists Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, “nudges” are precepts from social psychology and behavioral economics that make it easier for people to choose more “desirable” decisions (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). The primary idea behind nudges is to engage a type of “liberal paternalism” to make it easier or even automatic for participants to make smarter choices (i.e. those considered to improve health, or increase financial stability, etc.) without heavy-handed intervention (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009).

Behavioral insights can be used to inform the delivery, timing, and framing of WASH promotion, shaping water consumption patterns and encouraging water utility-maximizing habits in the process. Nudges became a focal point of implementation strategy in 2015 when the World Bank published its annual report on creatively integrating behavioral insights into a number of their investment projects (The World Bank 2015).

One of the studies published in this very report examines the effectiveness of water conservation efforts after a tunnel collapsed in the city of Bogota, Colombia. This collapse triggered a shortage and required residents to be hyper-conscious of their consumption behavior (The World Bank, 2015). The local Colombian government used the principle of saliency and “just-in-time reminders” by distributing stickers of a statue of San Rafael (a local symbol for the emergency reservoir covering interim water needs). They instructed local residents to place the sticker by the faucet they used most frequently (Ibid). By reminding people of the San Rafael reservoir each time they brushed their teeth or washed the dishes, the government was able to reduce local water consumption using heightened saliency and a constant reminder to curb excessive water use. This intervention was paired with a marketing campaign and an initiative that publicly rewarded those who were cooperating with water saving recommendations, putting the principle of social norms to full effect by calling attention to those taking reduction in water use seriously and setting the bar there.

Nudges in WASH like this are being implemented in a number of pilot programs. In 2016, the World Bank

published a white paper with nudges that could curtail open defecation practices in a number of cities. Among these proposed nudges were considerations of social rituals, such as recommending that public toilets be strategically placed in areas that shaded where social activity takes place during the day (Neal et al. 2016). Other programmatic tweaks that could make it easier for people to become acclimated to community latrines include building latrines in locations that already established routines such as water gathering or the washing of clothes take place.

Another experiment by The Center for Effective Global Action at the University of California Berkeley used decision framing techniques and verbal commitments to encourage people to adopt point-of-use (POU) safe water technologies, such as chlorine or a filter to reduce diarrheal risk in Nyanza, Kenya (Luoto et al., n.d.). The study found that framing POU deterrents in a positive way that both established social norms and helped individuals feel more productive, and by asking participants to make verbal pledges to use such POU technologies, increased the likelihood of uptake by around 10 percent (Ibid). When converted into disability-adjusted life years (DALYS), providing chlorine tablets and distributing framed marketing materials saved roughly 0.9 lives and 27 DALYS averted among 1-59 month olds at a cost of \$153.62 per DALY (Ibid).

With these nudge pathfinder projects validating the potential for nudges to influence human behavior, the door is wide open for creative new interventions that could proliferate WASH practices in a non-invasive way. Future-applied behavioral insights could play out in a number of forms. For example, a well-documented phenomenon first investigated by Daniel Kahneman called “loss aversion” demonstrates that people are willing to avoid losing something in greater magnitude than acquiring an equivalent gain (Kahneman, 2015). As a rule of thumb, WASH curriculum in schools and community centers should be consistent in explaining the ramifications of waterborne illness as “losing health”, emphasizing the deficit of health experienced rather than any immunity or “health gain” experienced by adopting healthier behaviors. To foster water conservation, water utility companies may choose to install water meters inside the home so that it is clearly visible for families to track their water use in real time. To discourage open defecation, marketing campaigns could create caricatures that lampoon such behavior, making it socially inappropriate to do so. To increase security and the level of safety women feel in using a public latrine, toilets could be placed in front of local governments or police centers, or have nearby community surveillance groups so that anyone wishing to use a facility can do so in peace and without fear.

WASH nudges can and should be specifically targeted at women, who are ideally positioned to influence the behavior of their children, peer groups/social circles, and spouses. Other potential nudges could be added to menstruation and pregnancy programming (e.g. building new identities to make girls proud of reaching menarche or by making it easier for women to breastfeed). They could also be added to water conservation efforts such as those in Colombia, or in agriculture where the need for strategic water allocation is ever-present. Nudges are often simple programmatic elements—like whether or not a latrine is in your direct line of sight when you wake up—and can make a measurable difference in the adoption of WASH in many lives at little or no cost.

Looking Forward

Securing water access for all, especially in the light of projected global water scarcity, is inherently tied with laying the foreground for women to fully actualize themselves for the benefit of their families, communities, and most importantly, themselves. Thriving women with an expanded array of opportunity provide benefit for entire communities (and even governments) that bear the true social costs of gender inequality in terms of forgone production, suboptimal population health, and exclusion of roughly half the population. Employing

user-centered design models provide donor organizations and governments free or very low cost insights into how to increase uptake of WASH practices. Similarly, nudges with fairly low price tags help make the decision to save water, or wash your hands, or use a latrine cognitively easier by guiding participants in the right direction. Smart, user-centered, “nudgable” policies that actively consider how water issues affect women and meet women where they are could be the key to mitigating the effects of water insecurity. The fact of the matter is that when women no longer have to plan their days around water, they are able to thrive. Thriving women provide for a thriving society.

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**The Preservation of the Monroe Doctrine and the Cold War: Nicaragua and the United States
A Historical Survey of U.S.-Nicaraguan Relations throughout the 20th Century into the Present Day.**

Kristin M. Fioretti

I. Introduction

As the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Nicaragua is delicately poised between the struggle of centuries-old revolutionary inclinations and contemporary attempts to participate on the world stage. The introduction of the Monroe Doctrine in the 19th century heightened the involvement of the United States in Latin America. Throughout the 20th century, the Somoza dictatorship ruled Nicaragua from a hardline anti-communist stance that cooperated with U.S. foreign policy and intelligence work in the region. With the collapse of the dictatorship in 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) came to power. Despite initial efforts by the United States to establish diplomatic relations with the new government, the Sandinista Front welcomed relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union. U.S. diplomatic efforts attempted to assuage these concerns with foreign aid and recognition for the new government. However, the Sandinista Front's support for the Leftist guerrilla movement in El Salvador ruptured relations with the U.S. and led to the termination of humanitarian assistance.

The Reagan administration sought to establish a new order of policy in Nicaragua through the Reagan Doctrine, which in many ways, brought about a continuation of the Monroe Doctrine suited to the demands of the Cold War. The efforts of this Doctrine included severed aid, a trade embargo, and U.S. military and financial support for the Contra movement, the right-wing militant group in opposition to the Sandinistas. As a result of these policies and the general political instability, Nicaragua erupted into a bloody civil war between the Sandinista Front and the Contras. During this time period, the Reagan administration spearheaded the global fight against communism. The Iran-Contra scandal effectively violated U.S. law by deceiving stakeholders and securing funds for the Contra movement. Despite U.S. assistance, the Contras were ultimately defeated, and free elections were held in 1990.

In November 2016, President Daniel Ortega of the FSLN party was re-elected for his fourth term, with long-lived grievances against the political elites stirring again. The country's shift to relations with China and Russia has heightened U.S. diplomatic concerns. Once again, the future of relations with Nicaragua remains uncertain.

II. The History of American Involvement in Nicaragua

Throughout Nicaragua's short history as an independent nation, the country has experienced tremendous struggles to establish itself as a democratic republic. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Nicaragua began in 1849, and were marked by periods of U.S. military intervention and armed conflict (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). Central to the U.S. security concern was the preservation of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which stated that the U.S. would not tolerate European colonial involvement in the Western Hemisphere. For Nicaragua, the implementation of this doctrine included routine U.S. intervention aimed at maintaining stability in the region (Turner, 1987).

The rise of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua led to an increasingly complex relationship between the two nations in the 20th century. In the early 1930s, General Anastasio Somoza Garcia became the first

director of the Nicaraguan National Guard. During this time, the most definitive figure of Nicaraguan socialism and identity in modern standards, General Augusto Sandino, led a guerilla war against the conservative regime backed by the U.S. government and supported militarily by deployed U.S. Marines. In 1934, the Nicaraguan National Guard assassinated Sandino, and Somoza gained the presidency through a coup two years later. By the time Somoza began his presidency, the U.S. was overwhelmed by foreign relations challenges and the Great Depression. The onset of the Cold War allowed Somoza to prove his loyalty to U.S. interests in the region, leading to the renewal of policies favorable to the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1952, President Somoza Garcia arrived in Washington to discuss building stronger relations between the new nations in the post-WWII era. During this time, the CIA had begun to use covert missions as a way to assert U.S. influence against communism through a cost-effective and clandestine manner. The election of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, a suspected communist sympathizer, heightened U.S. intelligence concerns over the spread of communism in the region. When Somoza met with the CIA during his visit, he contended that if arms were provided to the Nicaraguan National Guard, Nicaragua would support the covert mission of a regime change. With Nicaraguan support, the CIA moved forward with the plan to dispose of President Arbenz and replace him with General Carlos Castillo Armas, a staunch anti-communist loyal to U.S. interests. Containing communism in Central America allowed the U.S. to focus on Vietnam and Cuba.

By the early 1970s, the U.S. had lost interest in the practicality of Nicaraguan democracy when Somoza's son, Anastasio Somoza DeBayle, overtook the presidency. President Somoza DeBayle ruled Nicaragua through the iron fist of the National Guard. Under his presidency, the most notable oppositional group, the Sandinista Front, began to grow, despite the perception that the United States supported the Somozas. The FSLN took its name from General Sandino, and used his legacy to convey their ideological guerrilla fight against the U.S.-backed Somoza dictatorship.

III. The Sandinista Revolution

On December 23, 1972, an earthquake devastated the capital city of Managua, killing 10,000 people and leaving another 250,000 people homeless (St. John, 1987). The United States and Mexico donated millions of dollars in humanitarian assistance aid. President Somoza DeBayle, along with his close allies, plundered much of the foreign aid to enrich themselves. During this time, opposition grew substantially and the FSLN became more powerful as a guerrilla force. A conservative non-Marxist opposition, friendly to the United States, also began to grow but fell into disarray when, by early 1979, the United States had not convinced Somoza to step aside (Christian, 1987). As a result of this, ties developed between the Sandinistas and the conservative moderates to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship.

During the 1970s, three factions emerged from the FSLN: the Prolonged Popular War (GPP), the Proletarian Party, and the Terceristas, each with different approaches to political strategy and how to remove Somoza from power. While both the GPP and the Proletarian Party anticipated a prolonged struggle to overcoming oppression, the Terceristas advocated a broad-based coalition of all anti-Somoza forces, including business class elites (Sklar, 1988). Unifying these three factions would be instrumental in the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship and Sandinista victory.

In mid-July of 1979, President Somoza DeBayle surrendered the presidency and fled the country. His loyal supporters and members of the Nicaraguan National Guard fled to Honduras, El Salvador and the United States. Following the collapse of the dictatorship, the FSLN set up a nine-person National Directorate with the appointment of three representatives from the three factions of the GPP, Proletarian Party and the

Terceristas. The formation of the Directorate raised questions over the direction of Nicaragua's future. The main question, in light of the overwhelming political instability, was the pace and tactics of movement towards Marxist socialism (Tierney, 1982).

While the Sandinista military survived, the coalition force that once included conservatives and moderates in the Terceristas failed. Forces that worked together to oust the Somoza dictatorship soon deteriorated in the face of the new ruling Sandinista Front. The young political force that set out to unify Nicaragua would have to create new foreign relations policies towards the United States, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. Shortly after the inception of the new government, a new war would threaten the stability of Nicaragua- U.S. relations.

IV. Post-Somoza and a Young Democracy

In May 1980, the U.S. Congress approved \$75 million dollars of aid to Nicaragua with the requirement that Nicaragua not support terrorism or violence in other countries in the region (Turner, 1987). For Nicaragua, this amount was the largest donation of aid by any country or donor. The strict requirements forced the Directorate to examine and analyze what type of government Nicaragua would establish. There was competing pressure from Cuba, the United States, and the Soviet Union in the pursuit of establishing ideological influence through varying forms of aid.

To supplement the economic aid, Congress proposed a partnership through the Peace Corps, a program that aimed to establish a direct relationship between the two countries, while introducing American and U.S. democratic values to counter anti-Yankee rhetoric. The Peace Corps program failed to be implemented, while Cuban and Soviet doctors and teachers continued to operate in Nicaragua. By dispatching Soviet and Cuban professionals into the countryside, the FSLN perpetuated a sympathetic image of Marxist revolution from the bottom-up. The peasant farmer masses were glorified as the foundation of liberation and Marxist revolution.

During this time, U.S. intelligence reports indicated growing Nicaraguan support for Salvadoran Marxist guerrillas. The reports noted that massive amounts of arms, ammunition, and military equipment began arriving in Nicaragua from Vietnam and other communist states (Turner, 1987). The U.S. prioritized continued involvement in the region in order to establish control for fear of the region's shift towards communism. In the aftermath of Vietnam, U.S. intelligence policy was now focused increasingly on the conflicts in Latin America. The threat of Soviet involvement in the region led to U.S. uneasiness about Nicaragua's strengthened ties with Cuba and Central American Marxist groups. The U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence Pezzullo, met with Junta leaders Sergio Ramirez and Daniel Ortega to discuss evidence that showed FSLN aid being given to Salvadoran guerrilla forces. Pezzullo addressed U.S. concerns, and identified measures that Nicaragua would have to take in order to demonstrate their good faith and adherence to conditions of foreign aid (Pastor, 1987). Rather than resolve the issue, the Sandinista's resentment and opposition towards U.S. influence and involvement grew. Directorate and Junta leader Daniel Ortega remarked:

We have decided to defend our revolution by force of arms, even if we are crushed, and to take the war to the whole of Central America if that is the consequence... We have an historical prejudice towards the United States, because of that country's attitudes which makes us fear attack from it, and look for all possible means of defense. We are interested in seeing the guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala triumph, when we see that there is no good will in the United States towards us. (Pastor, 1987)

In the aftermath of these actions, the Carter administration suspended aid. Any further considerations regarding humanitarian assistance and the future of relations with Nicaragua would be left to the Reagan administration set to take office in January 1981. However, the Reagan administration's reluctance to reach new agreements and concessions with Nicaragua led to the eventual termination of foreign aid on April 1, 1981.

Additionally, the Reagan administration was effective in putting pressure on multilateral banks, including the World Bank, to reduce assistance. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) provided Nicaragua with \$193 million and the World Bank gave \$91 million between August 1979 and June 1981. From late 1981 to 1984, the IDB provided Nicaragua with just \$34 million, while the World Bank gave only \$16 million (Leogrande, 1996). The organizations declared that the decision to reduce aid was a result of Nicaragua's need for revitalization of their private sector. As a result of this policy, the Nicaraguan government faced serious constraints and debts.

The Reagan administration began to examine other possible options to address the Nicaraguan issue and its implications on U.S. national security policy. The new administration believed in taking greater action to prevent further communist gains in Central America. This approach was evidenced by growing hostility over severed diplomatic and financial ties for the Sandinista Front. The administration's efforts to push Nicaragua to its breaking point only reinforced the ideological struggle over Nicaragua's future as a free republic. Instead of countering that through diplomatic efforts, the Reagan administration worked to develop an alternative strategy: a covert mission that militarized and armed the opposition party in exile, the Contras.

V. Formation of the Contras and U.S. Military Aid

The moderate opposition that once unified itself with the Sandinistas in order to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship soon felt disenfranchised by the new Leftist rise. This group, along with old Nicaraguan National Guard members in exile, presented the United States with a separate option for establishing influence in the region and rebuilding relations. The many factions required military assistance, training, financial assistance and guidance on solidifying themselves into one united force against the Sandinista Front. To make this united force possible, the Reagan administration turned to the CIA to spearhead control of the operation. These early efforts were the beginning of the Reagan Doctrine, a policy of supporting anti-communist resistance movements against the Soviet Union's Marxist-Leninist satellites in the Third World (Leogrande, 1986). While U.S.-backed involvement in the region was once dictated by military intervention and the Monroe Doctrine, the modern world required policy plans of covert actions to address the Leftist ideological shift.

A declassified CIA report entitled "The Soviet Policy Toward Nicaragua" described important Soviet motives that strengthened America's response and involvement in Nicaragua. The CIA ascertained that Nicaragua's importance for Soviet policy in Latin America was second only to Cuba, and that military assistance to Nicaragua began in 1982. Soviet ideological support of Marxist-Leninist state rule, together with increasing amounts of aid, effectively shaped anti-Americanism and the buildup to protect that mission. The CIA concluded that, "It is conceivable, although we have no evidence for it, that the Soviet leadership itself views its support of the Sandinistas not only as a move to build Communism and extend Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere, but also as a counterweight to U.S. assistance to insurgencies against Soviet clients elsewhere" (Directorate of National Intelligence, 1986). Soviet policy towards Nicaragua was viewed by the United States as an act of aggression to gain influence in the region, highlighting the

importance of revitalizing the Monroe Doctrine through building relationships with forces in the region that were friendly towards U.S. interests.

VI. The Reagan Doctrine

The concept of the “Reagan Doctrine” describes the policy of the Reagan administration through which financial and operational support was given to anti-communist movements in an effort to defy Soviet-supported aggression. Rather than seeking to contain communist expansion, the Reagan doctrine worked within the John Foster Dulles’ “roll-back” strategy, through which the United States would actively push back against the influence of the Soviet Union in various state and state actors (U.S. Department of State, 2009). The perpetuation of the Monroe Doctrine to prevent the influence of European powers in the Western Hemisphere, coupled with a strategy that took action against the Soviet Union, solidified the importance of Nicaragua in the region. To make that possible, the Reagan administration would face an uphill battle in seeking the funds necessary to implement this policy.

On November 17, 1981, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 17, approving a \$19.95 million program to organize anti-Sandinista rebels against the Cuban-Sandinista support structure in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America (Morley & Petras, 1987). To complement this directive action, President Reagan signed an intelligence order directing the CIA to organize a team to begin operations against the Sandinistas (Pastor, 1987). The mission overshadowed the fact that Reagan still sought diplomatic concessions with Nicaragua, in the hope that covert actions and militarization of the Contras would not be necessary. These efforts were led by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas O. Enders. Enders attempted a diplomatic initiative to reopen negotiations with Nicaragua, but his efforts were struck down by hardliners in the Reagan administration. National Security Adviser William Clark, Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey, members of the NSC and the Defense Department, argued that negotiations with communists were futile and only useful to silence critics in Congress and the public (Scott, 1997). At the same time, the Sandinistas began campaigns that solidified a commitment to the ideological revolutionary state, much like what had occurred in Cuba.

Hardliners in the Department of Defense, CIA, and NSC sought the implementation of a trade embargo while the departments of State, Commerce, and Treasury ascertained that such measures would violate the Organization of American States and UN charters (Scott, 1997). Nicaragua relied heavily on trade as a means of economic development, investment, and livelihood.

The publicity of U.S. support for Nicaraguan rebel activity led to opposition from Congress. At first, this opposition was in the form of a proposal to prohibit the use of CIA funds in overthrowing the Nicaraguan government. However, in December 1982, Intelligence committee Chairman Edward Boland (D-MA) replaced the proposal with an amendment (Scott, 1997). The Boland Amendment aimed to limit governmental assistance to the Contras. Hardliners continued to block suggestions from Congress and the State Department that called for negotiations. The result was years of discord amongst the various agencies that fought over defining exactly what was occurring in Nicaragua, and what this meant for the future of stability in the region.

By July 1983, the administration’s attempts to influence and persuade Congress into continued aid for the Contras had mixed results. The Boland Amendment barred funds for support of military or paramilitary activities in Nicaragua (Scott, 1997). While the House members voted to pass the Boland Amendment, the Senate did not pass the legislation. This allowed for the continuation of U.S. funds and Contra aid. However,

the fight over aid questions continued, and President Reagan signed a resolution that included the Boland II Amendment. Boland II stated:

During Fiscal Year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement or individual (Sobel, 1995).

The Reagan Doctrine and Contra aid brought up memories of Vietnam, and the casualties and wasted funds that failed to accomplish the mission of containing communism. The Reagan administration used the communist victories in Vietnam and Cuba to justify why Contra aid was necessary. Vying for power over the policy-making process in Nicaragua, the Reagan administration would seek alternatives in getting around the Boland II Amendment and securing the support to continue the Reagan Doctrine. The following table shows the breakdown of Congressionally-approved funds to the Contras from 1982-1990. Despite varying levels of assistance, the Contras were well supplemented by U.S. aid in both nonlethal and military financial assistance.

Fiscal Year	Total	Nonlethal	Military
1982	19	-	19
1983	29	-	29
1984	24	-	24
1985-1986	27	27	-
1986	13	13	-
1987	100	30	70
1988	32.9	32.9	-
1989	27	27	-
1989-1990	49.75	49.75	-
Totals	321.65	179.65	142

Source: Nina Serafino, "Contra Aid: Summary and Chronology of Major Congressional Actions" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 1989), 17.

VII. The Iran-Contra Scandal

An initial strategy to circumvent Boland II was through the use of private and third-country donors. Private donors included wealthy U.S. citizens sympathetic to Reagan's Contra policy. The funds were donated through the tax-exempt foundation *The National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty* (Walsh, 1993). U.S. government personnel solicited third-country donor funds from Saudi Arabia, an unconstitutional and illegal course of action. While third-country assistance was cost-effective, survival of the Contras required greater financial support.

Beginning in 1984, the White House began a secret effort to procure additional aid for the Contras. Oliver

North, a military aide for the NSC, was responsible for overseeing this task. North proposed the direct sale of arms to Iran with the proceeds to be given to the Contras in Nicaragua. The short-lived scheme did little to support the Contras; it is estimated that the Contras received only about \$2 million in aid from this policy, far less than the \$32 million in third-party aid that they received from Saudi Arabia (Brown University, n.d.). Despite such small gains in funds, the scandal shocked the world and embarrassed the Reagan administration. The efforts violated the Boland II Amendment and a Congressional Committee later investigated the abuse of power.

On November 26, 1986, President Reagan publicly announced the arms sales diversion scheme, leading to the creation of the Tower Commission. The Tower Commission examined the operations and role of the NSC in the Iran-Contra scandal, and criticized Reagan for his lack of awareness on behalf of his administrative staff. Congressional hearings and indictments of several key intelligence officials led to convictions, all of which were later pardoned by President George H.W. Bush.

In an effort to protect the Intelligence Community's role in global national security operations, President Bush created the statutory Inspector General of the CIA (IG) position in 1989. The IG is nominated by the President and is confirmed by the Senate to oversee the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in the management of CIA operations. The office of the IG is responsible for advancing the agency's mission in deterring fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement through working with the Department of Justice and other federal agencies (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2011).

The Iran-Contra scandal highlighted the extent to which the Reagan administration went in order to restore democratic order and influence in Nicaragua. The administration felt empowered to take the chance of committing illegal operations with the hubris of the Reagan Doctrine. The deeper history and connections demonstrates the United States' unwavering commitment to the spread of democracy throughout the Latin American region.

VIII. Sandinista Victory

In 1987, the Sandinista Front signed peace agreements with the Contras, bringing the long civil war to an end. Soviet arms deliveries to Nicaragua came to an end in 1990 when Violeta Chamorro of the National Opposition Union (UNO) beat opponent Daniel Ortega of the FSLN to become President of Nicaragua. After decades of struggle, the FSLN succeeded power to the opposition, while the world watched with amazement. While tension between the two groups continued throughout the 1990s, national reconciliation efforts were successful to bridge the divide and move the country forward.

In 2006, Daniel Ortega of the FSLN was elected president of Nicaragua, and has been in power ever since. Municipal elections for local state governments were held in 2012, and Transparency International found evidence of fraud in 70 of 153 municipalities. As a result of those elections, the FSLN now controls 134 of the 153 city halls across the country (Rogers, 2012). Both of Ortega's presidential elections in 2006 and 2011, as well as the municipal victories in 2012, were denounced by the State Department as a setback to democracy in Nicaragua, undermining the ability of Nicaraguans to hold their government accountable (Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, 2014). In 2014, the Sandinista-controlled General Assembly approved Ortega's constitutional amendment abolishing presidential term limits. On November 6, 2016, President Ortega was reelected with his running mate and wife, Rosario Murillo. Nicaragua continues to reinforce concerns in the region and the future of stability is dependent on continuing to build stronger relations between Latin America and the United States.

IX. Conclusion: The Future of Stability in Nicaragua

Nicaragua lies just south of the most dangerous criminal region in the world, the Northern Triangle of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. Growing instability and crime have risen dramatically in these three countries and have created a policy crisis for Mexico and the United States. Unlike its northern neighbors, Nicaragua is less frequently referenced in America's public diplomatic efforts to address drug trafficking, illegal immigration and public safety. However, Nicaragua has, and will remain, an element of concern in America's sphere of influence.

Despite consistent diplomatic relations with the United States since the conclusion of the Nicaraguan Civil War, President Ortega has developed stronger relations with China, Russia, Venezuela and Iran. Growing tensions among the United States, Russia and China can be felt in Nicaragua. A Chinese billionaire proposed the project of the Nicaraguan Canal in 2013. The canal would cut through delicate environmental regions and indigenous lands. There has been strong opposition and pushback from Nicaraguan citizens and social justice groups, citing environmental and human rights concerns. As of this year, construction still has not begun on the canal, calling into question the validity of any future Chinese cooperation. The supporters of the project hope it will increase FSLN support, but it has only fueled anti-Sandinista tension instead. The United States is losing some of the influence it once held in Latin America, and Russia is eager to become involved in the region.

Over the last decade, Russia has enjoyed a relationship with Venezuela through the sale of arms and military contracts. Recently, Russia has begun to cement a similar relationship with Nicaragua. In May, Russia shipped several battle tanks to Nicaragua and began talks over a proposed Russian airfield on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast. The possibility of Russia flexing their strength as a global power, while gaining military access to Nicaragua, could bring new focus to the region. Nicaragua will remain an element of concern in the United States' sphere of influence especially with Daniel Ortega as president indefinitely.

The maintenance of the Sandino ideology has fostered important relationships among similarly-governed countries in Latin America, including Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, and Ecuador. In terms of fiscal support, the most significant of these diplomatic relations is that with Venezuela. Nicaragua has enjoyed a stable level of foreign aid from Venezuela's state-owned oil fund. This aid led to the creation of ALBANISA (ALBA de Nicaragua, South America) managed directly by the FSLN's treasurer, Francisco Lopez Centeno ("Daniel Ortega", 2016). At its height in 2012, ALBANISA's total holdings were totaled at more than \$728.7 million (*Stratfor*, 2015). Total foreign aid contributions over the course of nine years are estimated at around \$3.5 billion dollars, as revealed in a special report from the Nicaraguan newspaper *Confidencial*, citing 1207 leaked documents from ALBANISA (Olivares, 2016). The aid is critical to Ortega's social programs and public transportation for the Nicaraguan people. However, with Venezuela's economy in decline, significant cuts have been made to foreign aid. In the first half of 2015, aid to Nicaragua was decreased by almost a quarter to about \$193 million, a reduction that could have serious political implications for the future of Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista party (*Stratfor*, 2015). The importance of Nicaragua's simultaneous membership in the Central American Free Trade Agreement, which includes trade provisions with the United States, suggests a thin line between Ortega's pronounced discontent for America's "imperialism" and the pragmatic acceptance of American governmental foreign aid and investment.

Ortega is in a delicate position as a former guerrilla fighter who now holds the presidency in a country aligning itself with despots as corrupt as those he fought against. If the FSLN continues to operate in a

fashion similar to the dictatorship that they once overthrew, the threat of a new revolution lingers. In addition to deepening corruption in the political realm, rumors have surfaced of former Contra groups reestablishing their traditional rural strongholds of Jinotega and Nueva Guinea. The government denies that politically motivated rebels exist, stating instead that “criminal groups” are responsible for recent killings such as the 2014 attack on Sandinista supporters, when five people were killed and 19 wounded by masked assailants machine-gunning a bus returning from an FSLN rally (Robles, 2016). In February 2010, former Contra leader Jose Gabriel Garmendia was mysteriously murdered two weeks after he posted a video denouncing Ortega’s bid for reelection and declaring that he had taken up arms against the government. Since Garmendia’s death, anti-Sandinista groups, including the Armed Forces of National Salvation and the Democratic Force Commander 3-80, have pledged to “use bullets” if Ortega stays in power (Pachico, 2011). The existence of anti-FSLN factions in Nicaragua could prove dangerous to the Ortega’s presidency in the years to come. Additionally, the growing threat of instability in Latin America reinforces the need for U.S. involvement in the region.

President Ortega’s need to subdue the threat of oppositional groups could lead to increased cooperation and involvement with Russia. Russia’s arms sales and military talks with Nicaragua in the last year brings back memories of Soviet military aid during the 1980s. With a new U.S. President, the future of national security policy in Latin America will be tested. Nicaragua’s proximity to the United States and the question of great power alliances must be addressed by U.S. foreign policy in an effort to develop stronger regional diplomatic relations and ensure the future stability of the region.

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Gender Diversity in Politics: Current Trends

By Jacquelyn Katuin

The U.S. population is 50.8 percent female; however, women are chronically underrepresented in the national political arena (United States Census Bureau, 2011). At the federal level, 20 percent of Senators and 18 percent of House members are female. State legislatures are slightly more representative, with women making up 24 percent of all state legislators. However, only 10 percent of U.S. governors are female (Motel, 2014). Minority women are even less likely to serve as political leaders; only 6.2 percent of members of Congress are women of color (CAWP, 2015). In a 2010 report, the World Economic Forum (WEF) ranked the United States as 40th in political empowerment for women (Hausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi, 2011).¹ By 2016, the United States had dropped to 73rd in political empowerment for women (World Economic Forum, 2016). While this shift can be heavily attributed to the increase in political empowerment scores in other countries, as opposed to a sharp decline in the American score, it remains a salient signal about the stagnation of gender equity in American politics (McGregor, 2013).

Women have made marginal gains in American politics since the 1970s. However, the increase in female participation has plateaued since the early 2000s, and is still not equal with participation levels of their male colleagues. In the past 25 years, there has only been a nine percent increase in women's representation in the House of Representatives (Representation, 2016). From 2016 to 2017, there was actually a slight decrease in the percentage of women in Congress, accompanied by a small increase in female participation in state legislatures (CAWP, 2017). This stagnation and marginal decline in representation may be due to broader institutional and structural barriers that continue to block women from entering the political arena. Nearly 100 years after the passage of the 19th Amendment, women are less than two-fifths of the way to gender parity in government (Representation, 2016).

There is historical evidence that putting political power in the hands of women is beneficial for society as a whole. Decreased child mortality rates have been causally linked to women's suffrage in the late 1800s and early 1900s (Miller, 2008). There is also evidence that suffrage in the United States provided women with leverage for other policy changes, including mother's pensions, the abolition of child labor, and improved health and safety standards (Sparks, 1995). A growing body of research has focused on the impact of gender diversity on legislative bodies in the United States, and around the world. Statistical analysis suggests that diverse legislatures are more responsive to minority issues, and lend more credibility and legitimacy to the policies they create (Minta and Sinclair, 2013).

In addition to greater attention to social welfare policies and minority issues, there is evidence that women are particularly effective legislators. Recent research indicates that women are not only as effective as men, but can be even *more* effective legislators (Volden, 2010). There are documented gender differences in leadership styles, and in the types of legislation that women support. Data suggests that women are more

¹ This political empowerment score was based on the ratio of women to men in high-level positions in the government, but did not include information about the number of women in local government. The three main variables included in the analysis were: (1) the ratio of women to men in Parliament (2) the ratio of women to men at the ministerial level, and (3) the ratio of women to men in terms of the number of years they served in executive office (president or prime minister), over the past 50 years.

likely to exert high effort in legislatures, participate in consensus building efforts, and focus on specific “women’s issues.” For female legislators, it appears that their female identity transcends their political, racial, ideological, or party differences. Women tend to focus on issues related to health care, education, and policies that specifically impact women, such as sexual harassment and reproductive rights (Volden, 2010).

Social and Psychological Barriers

Two percent of the American public has run for political office, and of this population, only a quarter of candidates have been women (Motel, 2014). There are a myriad of social, psychological, and cultural reasons that help explain why women do not enter into the political arena. Gender norms and stereotypes continue to hinder women’s likelihood to run for office in the United States.² Politics in particular have been seen as an “old boys’ club,” or solely a domain for men (Volden, 2010). About 40 percent of Americans believe that women do not enter into political leadership roles because they are held to a higher standard than men (Pew, 2015). In addition to these socialized gender norms, women often face family obligations and private costs to public engagement (Sapiro, 1982). Fathers are typically praised when they run for office, while mothers, especially those with young children, are often criticized (Layton, 2007).

Gender norms are only one impediment that women face before running for office. Some studies show that women are considerably less likely to be encouraged to run for office by political activists or party leaders. Women also tend to view themselves as less qualified for public office than men (Fox and Lawless, 2004). Researchers have identified a gender disparity in those that run for office and discuss the “gatekeepers” or the individuals who end up selecting the candidate. Gatekeepers may be voters, party members, or political leaders; it is apparent that the biases of these individuals have an impact on who ends up winning elections. These gatekeepers are much more likely to be men, and therefore may make it more difficult for women to be successful political candidates (Conway, 2001). Though there are statistically significant disparities in the rates at which men and women run for office, when women do run, they win at the same rate as men (Fox and Lawless, 2004).

Structural and Institutional Barriers

In addition to social and cultural barriers to entry, there are several structural challenges that prevent women from entering politics. In the early 1980s, the average female Congressional candidate did not raise as much money as the average male candidate (Uhlener, 1986). Today, female candidates garner the largest share of their campaign funds through smaller individual donors. Democratic women are more successful at raising funds through individual donors than Republican women or men, primarily because of Political Action Committees (PACs) like EMILY’s list. However, Democratic women experience a gender gap when it comes to more significant donations, and are not as successful at bringing in large donors (Crespin and Deitz, 2010). There is also evidence that gender differences in campaign finance are more pronounced when women enter the political arena for the first time (Werner, 2007).

Gerrymandering and redistricting efforts also have a substantial impact on gender differences in politics. The majority party typically draws districts in an attempt to gain power or protect incumbents. This methodology often makes districts less competitive (FairVote). The practice of drawing districts to favor incumbents presents another barrier to entry for women into politics. Since there are fewer female incumbents than male

² According to a recent Pew Research survey, 54 percent of respondents said that a man would be better at running a professional sports team than a woman. However, Americans are more likely to see a woman as a better manager for a retail chain or hospital (Pew, 2015).

incumbents, gerrymandering favors male politicians. Additionally, a decrease in the number of competitive seats reduces the number of opportunities women have to enter the political arena, if and when they do decide to run (Fox and Lawless, 2004)

There are many different angles from which to address the issue of gender equity in politics. Since women can win elections at the same rate as men, it appears that the main barriers manifest themselves before women ever run for office. A comprehensive solution will need to tackle multiple parts of the pipeline. It is important to help young girls and professional women overcome cultural and social norms, and provide them with the tools to successfully address institutional barriers.

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Should Virginia Join the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative?

By Lena Lewis

Abstract: Climate change models predict that Virginia will face rising sea levels and increased flooding along the coast, as well as droughts and heat waves across the state. The damage caused by climate change will have negative economic and ecological impacts. In spite of this prognosis, Virginia has no statewide policy to reduce greenhouse gases that cause climate change. Virginia could effectively lower its carbon emissions by joining the nine other states that are currently members of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). RGGI is a carbon cap-and-trade program that puts a price on carbon dioxide emitted by power plants.

States participating in RGGI have decreased their carbon emissions and generated new revenue to fund programs in energy efficiency and renewable energy. Virginia could save administrative costs by joining RGGI, because the program has already been carefully planned and successfully implemented elsewhere, instead of starting our own statewide initiative. Joining RGGI would not noticeably decrease the impacts of climate change for Virginia, but it would signal to other states and nations that Virginia is doing its part to reduce the severity of climate change. Virginia should be part of the collective worldwide action needed to achieve deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, so we can collectively benefit from diminished climate disruption.

Introduction: Virginians Will Pay the Price for Climate Change

Virginia is just beginning to experience the effects of the market failure that results from our fossil-fuel driven economy. Climate change will cause some regions of Virginia to experience drought, more severe storms, and heat waves (Nash, 2014). Alteration of our ecosystems will lead to the extinction of some species. A warmer climate will allow mosquitos, ticks, and other parasites to spread disease more easily in Virginia, increasing our healthcare costs and decreasing worker productivity. The Hampton Roads region is acutely aware of the cost of climate change caused by the “business-as-usual” burning of fossil fuels. Hampton Roads is ranked second in the country, beat only by New Orleans, as most vulnerable to sea level rise (Center for Sea Level Rise, n.d.). By the end of the century, sea levels in the Chesapeake Bay region are projected to rise anywhere from 1.3 to 5.5 feet (Nash, 2014). Neighborhoods, industry, and critical infrastructure are vulnerable to increased risk of damage from storms and rising sea level. Citizens affected by climate change will need a source of revenue to pay for repairs and relocation. To avoid the worst effects of climate disruption in Virginia, the worldwide rate of greenhouse gas emissions must be drastically reduced. Virginia can make a persuasive case to the rest of the world to reduce greenhouse gas emissions only if Virginia also takes steps to dramatically reduce our own.

The market failure of a fossil-fuel-based economy lies in the negative externalities of producing and burning fossil fuels. This paper focuses on the externalized damages of carbon emissions. Though these remarks address only carbon emissions, efforts to reduce carbon emissions are likely to reduce other negative externalities of fossil fuel use, such as polluted water, leveled mountains, deforestation, and acid rain. Virginians pay a steep price for fossil fuels that is not reflected in the dollars spent.

Virginians cannot conquer climate change alone, nor can we expect others to take the steps we ourselves are unwilling to take. Virginia must show leadership in mitigating climate change so that others will join. So far,

Virginia has made the decision not to substantively reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The opportunity to change our approach is still available. We can accept the impacts of accelerating climate change on our communities and our economy, or we can take action to slow climate change down.

Virginia needs to alter our pricing of fossil fuels to reflect the true social cost of carbon emissions. One way to achieve this is to incorporate the cost of carbon emissions into the price of electricity. Virginia could join the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) as a way to put a price on carbon pollution. RGGI is a voluntary agreement among nine northeastern states to limit carbon emissions from power plants using the proven cap and trade approach. Now in its seventh year, RGGI has successfully decreased the participating states' power sector carbon emissions by 45 percent from 2005 levels without inhibiting economic growth in those states. This paper evaluates the efficacy of RGGI and its potential as a mechanism for Virginia to cost-effectively reduce its carbon pollution.

Current Renewable Energy Policies in Virginia

Virginia currently has no substantive policy to reduce carbon emissions. Unlike many states, Virginia lacks a renewable portfolio standard, mandating that a certain percent of the Commonwealth's electricity be generated using renewable energy (Richardson, Baille, & Cleetus, 2016). Virginia's policies to make renewable energy projects more affordable for residents and small businesses include tax breaks for materials, a Property Assessed Clean Energy Loans program (PACE), and subsidies to cover interest on renewable energy project loans (§ 58.1-3661; § 58.1-3508.6; "Law Amends" 2015; "Sustainable Energy," n.d.). All told, these incentives make small projects more affordable for individual homeowners, but do not significantly change the energy portfolio of the state. Joining RGGI's carbon cap-and-trade program would be the first comprehensive industry-wide step towards reducing Virginia's carbon emissions.

How the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Works

The nine states of the cooperative RGGI are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. They have set a cap on carbon emissions from power plants with capacities of at least 25 Megawatts. RGGI states sell one allowance for each short ton of carbon emissions through a quarterly auction. At the end of a three-year control period, power plants must turn in one allowance for each ton of CO₂ emitted, or pay a penalty. The auction is a "sealed-bid uniform price format" in which participating power plants submit confidential bids for a certain number of allowances (Ramseur, 2013). The price of the second highest bid becomes the clearing price that all bidders must pay. In a simplified example, if RGGI had 100 allowances to sell to 3 firms, suppose Firm A put in a bid of \$5 per allowance for 50 allowances, Firm B bid \$3 each for 30 allowances, and Firm C bid of \$2 for 40 allowances. The clearing price would be set to \$3 for all buyers. Firm A would buy 50 allowances, Firm B would buy 30, and Firm C would only be able to buy the 20 remaining balances.

RGGI decreases carbon emissions below established levels by lowering the cap over time. Special provisions have been built into RGGI to prevent prices from going too low or too high and to insure the program does decrease carbon emissions. Firms can buy allowances and bank them for the future. RGGI also allows carefully defined and monitored offset programs to account for a small percent of carbon allowances. These offset programs include afforestation, reduction of landfill gas leakage, and projects that either sequester or limit emissions of greenhouse gases (RGGI, Inc., 2016). No offsets have been used to date (W. Shobe, personal communication, Feb 12, 2017).

According to the fundamental principles of environmental economics, the most efficient way to reduce emissions from multiple sources is to have firms reduce their emissions until they all achieve equal marginal cost of abatement (MCA). A functioning cap-and-trade system allows firms to reach this point through the bidding process. A firm that has an MCA below the cost of one allowance will reduce its emissions rather than buy more allowances. As it reduces its emissions, its MCA increases. The firm will cease further emissions reductions once the MCA equals the price of allowances. A second firm that has a very high MCA will buy allowances until the MCA of its allowed emissions equals the price of allowances. This firm will have an incentive to find cheaper ways to reduce its emissions so that it can spend less money buying allowances.

Another principle of environmental economics states that maximum efficiency is achieved when the marginal cost of abatement equals the marginal cost of benefits to society. In other words, the marginal cost of abatement should not exceed the marginal societal value of the benefits resulting from the abatement. The federal government has placed the current working value of the social cost of carbon at approximately \$40 per short ton of carbon emissions (EPA, 2017). At the time of this writing, the RGGI auction clearing price was \$4.54 per short ton of carbon emissions, with the highest price reaching \$7.50 in December, 2015 (RGGI, Inc., 2016). The price of allowances is substantially lower than the social cost of carbon, which means that emitters are still paying less than is needed to make the deep cuts in emissions needed to reach globally optimal levels. The cap is being lowered slowly at 2.5 percent a year, giving electricity producers time to adjust their methods and avoid a price shock. The slow pace of cap reduction also means that polluters are not paying enough to counteract the full social cost of carbon. This essentially means that RGGI states are still externalizing part of the social cost of fossil-fuel generated electricity.

Advantages of RGGI

RGGI generates a new source of revenue for participating states. Projections suggest that Virginia could generate \$2.8 billion through 2030 by joining RGGI (Acadia Center, 2015). Under the Memorandum of Understanding among participating states, the original participating states agreed to spend at least 25 percent of the new revenues on “consumer benefit or strategic energy purpose[s]” (MoU, 2005, p. 12). This portion of allowance revenues is invested in projects that improve energy efficiency, increase clean energy, or otherwise reduce emissions. Since the beginning of RGGI, states have exceeded the 25 percent goal, using 65 percent of their revenues for energy efficiency (Ramseur, 2013). Investing revenues in projects that reduce carbon emissions make further cuts in carbon emissions possible in the future. RGGI, Inc., the nonprofit organization that runs the auctions, asserts that the benefits of energy efficiency do not only help those people who have more energy-efficient homes. These homes reduce the demand for electricity, which causes prices to decrease for all electricity customers. Homeowners spending less money on electricity will have more money to spend on other sectors of the economy (“Fact Sheet” 2016.). New York State’s renewable energy returns on investment were \$3-4 dollars per dollar invested (RGGI, Inc., 2016). As new types of efficiency and clean energy programs are developed, they potentially create more jobs. The Renewable Energy Policy Project calculated that investing \$1 million in renewable energy creates around 6 full-time manufacturing jobs plus other jobs in construction and maintenance (RGGI, Inc., 2016).

By joining RGGI, Virginia would not have to start a new emissions reduction program from scratch. Other states have already done considerable work in creating the program and demonstrating its proof of concept. Virginia can save a lot of time and administrative costs by joining this successful program.

The Environmental Benefit of Virginia Joining RGGI Alone is Negligible

From Virginia's perspective, the direct climate benefits of joining RGGI will be very small. The reduction in Virginia's emissions will be evenly distributed over the planet because carbon emissions mix uniformly into the global atmosphere. The direct environmental benefit to Virginia of our own reduced carbon emissions will be negligible. The rationale for action by a single state must arise from the power of numbers; Virginia is not alone in RGGI, but will be joining 9 other states, whose aggregate emissions rank among the top 20 nations (Ramseur, 2013). At the time of this writing, 134 countries have ratified the Paris Agreement ("Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification," n.d.). If countries stick to their commitments, we may reach the goal of holding climate change to only a 2°C increase in the planet's average temperature by the end of the century. This would limit sea level rise in the Hampton Roads region. It would reduce the chance of ecological disturbances throughout Virginia, and reduce the severity of climate disruption to our local agricultural and fishing industries. Taken together, and only taken together, worldwide reduction of carbon emissions will benefit Virginians. If we want those benefits, we need to take part in the worldwide efforts. Expanding RGGI is one substantive method to reduce climate change.

How VA Could Join RGGI

Changes to Virginia law would be required to authorize joining RGGI. Virginia's cap would initially be set at the level of expected emissions for the first year of participation, and decrease by 2.5 percent for each subsequent year. This cap would be added to the current RGGI cap to create a combined emissions cap for all RGGI states. Virginia would then be a partner to the multi-state Memorandum of Understanding and would participate in and be subject to the results of future program reviews.

Virginia's Department of Environmental Quality or Department of Energy would need to add administrative staff positions to oversee RGGI within the state and to manage the revenue brought in through allowance sales. The Department of Energy's primary goal is to "advance sustainable energy practices and behaviors" (Division of Energy, n.d.). Virginia's Department of Environmental Quality would provide allowance verification, and a third party would need to provide allowance verification as well (Center for Climate, n. d.). Virginia would also need to pay dues to RGGI, Inc. to run the auction. Maryland's FY 2015 data can provide an example of budget expectations. Maryland spent \$5.7 million of its RGGI revenues on administrative costs of the Energy Administration. This may sound sizeable, but it is small in comparison to the almost \$78 million Maryland raised in RGGI allowance auctions in 2015. Maryland paid approximately \$457,000 in RGGI dues in 2015 (Maryland Energy Administration, 2016).

Monitoring

One of the strengths of joining RGGI is that the EPA already collects data on the carbon emissions from power plants for RGGI (EPA FLIGHT, 2016). RGGI COATS is the RGGI CO₂ Allowance Tracking System platform that records data for each state's carbon allowances and compliance (RGGI, Inc., n. d.).

The RGGI cooperative has a periodic review to make adjustments as necessary, and has already used it to good effect. In 2012, after several years in which states' emissions were below the cap level and allowances were being sold at the floor price, members of RGGI lowered their 2014 cap from an initial level of 165 million tons CO₂ down to 91 million tons CO₂ (Ramseur, 2013). They decided to keep their original plan of decreasing the cap by 2.5 percent each year until 2020. RGGI states also decided not to save the unsold allowances from previous years. A 45 percent cap reduction in a single year sent a strong signal that RGGI

states were serious about making sure that RGGI functions as intended. These adjustments show that RGGI has the ability to be responsive to market conditions.

Addressing Stakeholder Concerns

RGGI's design has many elements to address the concerns of stakeholders. Some of the major stakeholders in climate change policy are power companies, consumer advocacy groups, environmentalists, social justice groups, and fiscal conservatives. Virginia power company executives can look to the experience of power companies in the RGGI region, who were able to recover the cost of allowances in the 2012-2014 period (Hibbard, Okie, Tierney, & Darling, 2015). A Cost Containment Reserve of allowances is available for purchase if the clearance price rises to a predetermined level (Ramsuer, 2013). This trigger price increases each year so power plants can adjust to the slowly increasing price of emission allowances. Utility companies will not be able to avoid the loss of revenue as customers' energy efficiency improves, and power plants dependent on coal will lose money.

Consumer advocacy groups can take heart that additional electricity costs to consumers will be minimal. In Maine, electricity customers pay an extra \$0.0024 per kilowatt hour, which translates to an extra \$1.27 per month for the average residential consumer (Griset, 2015). Overall, consumers have benefitted from reinvestment of some of the RGGI revenue into energy efficiency programs. Though electricity prices increased at first, consumers in the RGGI region collectively saved \$459 million by the end of 2014 (Hibbard, et al., 2015). Hibbard, et al. explain that these savings occurred through reinvestment of RGGI revenue into energy efficiency.

Environmental advocates and social justice groups will appreciate the RGGI requirement that states use at least 25 percent of revenues to support energy efficiency or clean energy projects. Those projects can include assistance to low-income households to make their homes more energy efficient and can make renewable energy installments more affordable to residents and small business owners. RGGI funds have also been used to cover energy costs for low-income residents. Most of all, environmental advocates will support a program that decreases carbon emissions from the power sector by 45 percent in just seven years.

RGGI states have developed a variety of creative clean energy and energy efficiency programs to address the particular needs of their residents. As previously mentioned, states chose to exceed the minimum requirement for use of RGGI funds for clean energy projects. Economic modeling for Maryland indicates that the state would benefit from the reinvestment of up to 100 percent of RGGI revenue into emission reduction programs (Paul, et al., 2010). Investment in emission reduction programs causes further decrease in emissions, but it would benefit the Maryland economy and create jobs. By 2014, RGGI states had invested over \$1.3 billion of auction proceeds in energy efficiency, clean energy, greenhouse gas abatement, and other measures that would further reduce emissions (RGGI, Inc., 2016). RGGI, Inc. estimates a return of \$4.67 billion on investments in emissions reductions, which benefits both the economy and the environment.

Fiscal conservatives will object to RGGI as a new form of revenue for Virginia. Though a new form of revenue will be created, it could be used to offset the cost to consumers through reduction in income taxes or a return of a dividend to tax payers, making the RGGI revenue-neutral (Burtraw, Sweeny, and Rawls, 2009). One criticism of a cap-and-trade system is that the resulting increased energy costs will have a greater negative effect on low-income consumers because a higher percent of their income is spent on energy. A dividend split evenly among all Virginians would ensure that the impact of RGGI is progressive, because the dividend returned to low-income consumers will offset a larger percent of their energy costs than for high-

income consumers. (Boyce & Riddle, 2007). Making revenue recycling part of the proposal to join RGGI could make the proposal more attractive to “small-government” conservatives while also appealing to low-income voters.

Finally, environmentalists may object that RGGI does not go far enough to capture all sources of greenhouse gas emissions. Only 22 percent of greenhouse gas emissions in RGGI states are covered by the RGGI cap (Ramseur, 2013). If high auction prices cause an increase in electricity prices, Virginians will find substitutes to heat their homes that may cause emissions of their own, such as natural gas. Requiring allowances only for large power plants will cause residents to purchase more appliances that use natural gas instead of electricity. Fortunately, the design of RGGI gives it the capacity to expand to cover more sources of carbon emissions. The Progress Review of 2012 demonstrated states’ abilities to make major revisions to caps and safety valves. Over time, RGGI could be used to cover not only all power suppliers, but all sources of greenhouse gas emissions, including transportation fuel, home heating fuel, and landfills.

Emissions Leakage

The power grid is set up across state boundaries, allowing power distributors to make use of the most cost effective sources of electricity. PJM is a power distributor that covers much of the current RGGI territory, but also covers non-RGGI states. One weakness of RGGI is that utility companies can shift their power sources to states outside of RGGI boundaries to avoid purchasing allowances. While this gives the appearance that carbon emissions have decreased in RGGI states, those carbon emissions have still been produced, but in other states instead. The migration of power production to carbon-emitting power plants outside of RGGI boundaries is called “emissions leakage”. A major and still unresolved question is whether emissions leakage has occurred, and to what degree. Chen (2009) predicted that emissions leakage would occur once states implemented RGGI in 2009. Chen defined leakage as the change in emissions of non-RGGI states compared to a baseline year prior to RGGI implementation. Chen also defined relative leakage:

$$\text{Relative leakage} = \left| \frac{\text{Change in emissions of non-RGGI states}}{\text{Change in emissions of RGGI states}} \right| \times 100$$

Thus, if the emissions increased by 80 short tons in a non-RGGI state, but decreased by 100 short tons in a neighboring RGGI state, the relative leakage would be 80 percent. Chen’s models of PJM power distribution predict a relative leakage of over 90 percent when the emissions allowance is less than \$7 per short ton. If these models are correct, then the environmental benefits of RGGI are minimal. Murray and Maniloff (2015) counter that if leakage is happening, the neighboring regions to which it is most likely shifting have energy portfolios that are lower in carbon emissions than those of the RGGI states. Chen (2009) also predicted that RGGI-induced leakage would increase electricity prices in the states from which the electricity is leaking, due to the increased demand for the electricity. If this prediction is correct, demand for electricity in those states would decrease. Therefore, leakage would still result in overall carbon emission reductions, though not as much as if no electricity were imported to RGGI states. The difficulty of measuring leakage leads to an essential question to answer if Virginia is to join RGGI: How can we tell that a change in carbon emissions is caused by RGGI and not by other factors, such as leakage or economic recession?

The Impact of RGGI

RGGI was introduced at roughly the same time as a major economic upheaval and an unexpected increase in the supply of natural gas. The decrease in emissions in RGGI states could have been caused by the Recession of 2008 leading to decreased energy usage. The rapid implementation of directional drilling and hydraulic fracking caused an unanticipated decrease in natural gas prices. Because natural gas emits only 48 percent of the carbon dioxide of an energetically equivalent quantity of coal, as power companies switch to natural gas, total carbon emissions will decrease (Murray & Maniloff, 2015). Murray and Maniloff analyzed economic models to determine the effect of different factors on the decline in emissions in RGGI states. They found that 24 percent of the change in RGGI emissions between 2009 and 2012 was caused by RGGI. Lower gas prices accounted for 14 percent and the recession accounted for another 14 percent. All RGGI states also have renewable portfolio standards which require a certain amount of the state's energy portfolio to come from renewable energy sources. Murray and Maniloff found that renewable portfolio standards accounted for another 12 percent of emission reductions in RGGI states. Their research suggests that RGGI is an effective method of emissions reduction.

As previously mentioned, Murray and Maniloff are not concerned about the impact of leakage in their analysis because the states neighboring the RGGI region fortuitously have lower carbon intensity energy portfolios. Maniloff elaborates on this idea by describing “beneficial leakage” caused by RGGI (Maniloff & Fell, 2016). The notion of “beneficial leakage” is that, though leakage is occurring, overall carbon emissions are still decreasing. Less electricity is generated by carbon-intensive sources within the RGGI region and is being replaced by electricity from natural-gas fired power plants in neighboring states. Maniloff and Fell estimate that $\frac{1}{4}$ of the apparent emissions reductions in the RGGI states was due to leakage, yet that leakage resulted in an additional one percent in emissions reduction. Combining this result with the results of Murray and Maniloff's analysis, the apparent 12 percent in emissions reductions credited to RGGI would only be nine percent, with the remaining three percent caused by leakage. RGGI is not designed to depend on “beneficial leakage,” nor should it. In the short term, beneficial leakage may cause a net reduction in carbon emissions, but it cannot lead to the deep carbon emissions reductions needed to significantly mitigate climate change.

Leakage is difficult to measure and difficult to prevent, but methods are available to combat it. Border adjustment policies alter the price of electricity entering or leaving a state. An import adjustment charges out-of-state electricity providers for selling their electricity to a cap-and-trade state. Economic models combining anti-leakage policies with a domestic carbon tax show that an import adjustment policy would increase domestic energy production and decrease imported energy (Fischer & Fox, 2012). Enacting a border adjustment policy in RGGI would not guarantee a reduction in emissions. Because electrons in the grid cannot be traced back to their source, power companies could make adjustments to their energy portfolio on paper only. A non-RGGI power company could tweak its paperwork to indicate it sent that electricity generated by low-emission sources into an RGGI state, while it sent electricity generated by high-emission sources to in-state customers. The most foolproof way to prevent leakage is to expand the RGGI to encompass the whole power grid.

Conclusion

Joining RGGI would be a relatively easy way for Virginia to put a price on carbon and reduce carbon emissions. The structure is already in place, thanks to careful work done by the original RGGI states. While

other emission reduction policies are worth analyzing, joining RGGI is a simple, politically feasible way in which Virginia can reduce emissions at a low-cost.

I do not recommend that Virginia also require a renewable portfolio standard as the rest of the RGGI states have done. When a cap-and-trade system is working correctly, utility companies and individuals will move toward using more renewable energy sources without further regulation. A renewable portfolio standard would be unnecessary and over-regulatory because increasing the price of carbon emissions would provide the incentive needed to add renewables.

Virginia can further negotiate an import adjustment for all electricity entering the state from non-RGGI states, and encourage other RGGI states to do the same. Finally, Virginia should negotiate that it not be required to spend a minimum percent of the RGGI revenue on clean or efficient energy programs. Virginia should be free to determine the highest priorities for its revenue and make the best investments for its own citizens. Some RGGI revenue could be used to retrain workers who lose their jobs in the transition to a low-carbon economy; the funds could also be used to provide an energy rebate to customers (W. Shobe, personal communication, Dec 7, 2016). Since emissions allowances are a new expense for utility companies, they could initially increase their electricity rates to cover the costs, which will disproportionately hurt low-income customers. A flat rebate to all customers would disproportionately help those low-income customers by covering a higher percent of their electricity bill than for high-income customers. The new RGGI revenue could also be used to offset reductions of other taxes. Removing restrictions to Virginia's spending of this revenue would make RGGI more politically viable. As Virginia leaders see the success of reinvesting RGGI revenues into improving the energy sector in other states, they may be convinced to make such investments in Virginia.

In spite of the careful comprehensive planning of RGGI and the significant emissions reductions it has achieved, it still regulates less than $\frac{1}{4}$ of all carbon emissions in RGGI states (Ramseur, 2013). The economic efficiency of equal marginal costs of abatements for all firms is not being fully achieved if $\frac{3}{4}$ of carbon emissions are unregulated. Thus, large power plants are paying more to abate carbon emissions than other sectors of the economy. Power plants with capacity less than 25 MW do not have to buy allowances, nor do facilities that use at least 10 percent of the electricity they generate on-site. Small facilities and individuals can buy allowances, which they could trade to large power plants on a secondary market (RGGI, Inc. 2016).

RGGI's real promise lies in its potential to scale up to cover all carbon-emitting sectors of society, including transportation, landfills, and residential natural gas. The true success of the RGGI program will be when no more emission allowances are bought, indicating society's transition to a fossil-fuel-free economy. Virginia should be a part of this success story.

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The Future of Foreign Policy with Iran, Considering Our Complex Past

By Tara Razjouyan

“Vicarious experience acquired from the past, even the remote past, gives such guidance to the present that history becomes its own reward.”

- Richard E. Neustadt

Just months into office, President Trump’s administration has begun to address a complex set of 21st century policy issues, including terrorism, global poverty, weapons advancements, gun violence, mass shootings, the opioid epidemic, and more. At the core of many of these international issues stands a philosophical debate: with American people showing increased support for isolationist policies, should the U.S. continue high levels of foreign engagement?

One issue that then-candidate Trump repeatedly brought up on the campaign trail was the Iran Deal negotiated under President Obama’s administration. Trump highlighted his commitment to reversing the Iran Deal, but the deal has yet to be overturned. To better understand the deal, it is crucial to break down the history of Iran and the history of U.S.-Iran relations. Only by understanding past precedent on this issue will decisions that maximize U.S. security, and the security of U.S. allies, be achieved.

History in Brief

Whether it is called the Persian Empire, Persia, Iran, or the Islamic Republic of Iran, this Middle Eastern nation has existed since 550 BCE. With an estimated population of 83 million, eight principal ethnic groups, seven major spoken languages, and high literacy, Iran has been an epicenter of various transnational issues since the latter half of the 20th century (The World Factbook, 2017). From Operation TPAJAX, to the Iranian Revolution, the Iran Hostage Crisis, the Iran-Contra Affair, the Iran-Iraq War, the Iran nuclear deal, or the latest presidential executive order on immigration, the history intertwining the U.S. and Iran is complex.

President Eisenhower, who served as the 34th President of the U.S. from 1953-1961, favored covert operations over large-scale military interventions in foreign policy. His presidency marked an era of covert policy decisions—many of which are reflected in the nature of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran today.

In 1953, the CIA led a coup—code name TPAJAX—against Iranian prime minister Mohammed Mossadegh, who had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company two years prior to the coup (*Oversight of Covert Action*, 2013). The CIA operation was motivated partially by British concerns that Iran would fall into communist hands. Another motivating factor was that the British government was being financially impacted by the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, as one of its major shareholders. The coup successfully reinstated the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, as the Iranian head of state. This installment created friction between the U.S. and Iran; dissatisfaction with the Shah eventually led to the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Under the Shah, Iran made significant social strides, but the Shah fell in popularity with the rapid Western social changes made and with the limited room for opposition to these changes. The state’s economic conditions and political scandals did not help. From 1959 to 1960, the richest 10 percent of urban households

accounted for 35.5 percent of total expenditures, indicating severe disparity in wealth distributions. Additionally, during the period between 1973 and 1974 the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy was found guilty of embezzling \$3.7 million, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, who happened to be the Shah's brother-in-law, was implicated in a "\$5 million kick-back scheme" (Abrahamian, 1980). Scandals such as these did not help the Shah's popularity.

As Abrahamian states in the "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution", the Shah modernized the nation's social structure, but its political structure was left underdeveloped. In 1975, the Shah made successive non-incremental changes that led to discontent, such as the Education Minister's order banning universities from registering women who continued wearing the chador (long veil). Protests over such government enforcement led to a stricter regime, and clerics who spoke out against the regime were thrown in prison. Social progress was juxtaposed with social strife, as the oil boom caused agricultural stagnation that led to an influx of migrants into urban centers. These young, unskilled migrants arriving in high quantities brought shantytowns to urban centers, where crime, alcoholism, prostitution, and other issues increased. The social changes led religious clerics to believe the regime's moral laxity caused such problems.

Despite these circumstances leading to mass dissatisfaction and protest by the Iranian people, on December 31, 1977, Jimmy Carter stated, "Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world" (Jimmy Carter). Almost two years later, this "island of stability" had its entire political regime altered by a revolution. The Iran hostage crisis, as well as the Iran-Contra, followed the revolution; these two events further worsened U.S.-Iran relations.

The Iranian Hostage Crisis began on November 4, 1979. Iranian students broke into the U.S. embassy located in Tehran and detained over 50 Americans for 444 days (The Iranian Hostage Crisis). A few weeks prior to the hostage crisis, the exiled Shah was admitted into the U.S. for medical treatment, a decision that aroused suspicion from Iran.

On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran in a surprise military offense, leading to an eight-year war with minimal gains and massive casualties for both sides (Iran-Iraq War, 2009). Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein subsequently claimed that the invasion that started the war was over a territorial dispute over the Shatt al-Arab River. Five years into the war, Iran made a request to buy weapons from the U.S. This led to the infamous Iran-Contra affair. At the time, Iranian terrorists in Lebanon were holding seven American hostages. The Reagan Administration was divided by the arms-for-hostages proposal; ultimately, the deal was carried out and more than 1,500 missiles were shipped to Iran (WGBH). More than half of the money from the deal was then diverted to the Contras, a guerilla force in Nicaragua that opposed the Sandinista government. The Iran-Contra Affair is considered by many to be one of the lowest points of the Reagan years. The controversial event resulted in the resignation of National Security Adviser John Poindexter and the dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of the National Security Council (NSC), and is generally regarded as a covert failure. Furthering tensions, at the end of the Iran-Iraq War on July 3, 1988, the U.S. Navy was exchanging fire with Iranian ships in the Persian Gulf when Navy ships mistook an Airbus A300 civilian airliner – or Iran Air 655 – for a F-14 fighter jet. The airbus was shot down, killing all of its 290 passengers and crewmembers. Although the incident was an accident, it was seen by Tehran as a signal of the U.S. openly entering the war on Iraq's side (Fisher, 2013).

As evidenced by these events, a simple covert operation in 1953 laid a foundation of poor relations between the U.S. and Iran, while complicating broader international relations. The Iran Hostage Crisis and post-revolutionary sentiments in Iran further enflamed the relations between the two nations.

The Current Situation

Three pinnacle events can best characterize the current political climate surrounding Iran: the Iran nuclear deal, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's 2017 speech to the Iranian people, and President Trump's recent executive order on immigration, entitled, "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States."

"The Iran Deal"

On July 14, 2015 Iran and the P5+1 nations (the U.S., the U.K, France, Russia, China and Germany) finalized a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This plan has come to be known as the Iran Deal (Katzman & Kerr, 2017). The JCPOA outlined constraints on Iran's nuclear program, and dictated that Iran can only use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in exchange for the "broad lifting of U.S., E.U., and U.N. sanctions on Iran." The deal included limiting Iran's stockpile of low-enriched uranium, and redesigning its heavy-water reactor at Arak without its original core of weapons-grade plutonium.

H.R. 1191—the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015—became public law on May 22, 2015. Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Bob Corker, introduced the Senate version of the act. The bill amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and outlined the procedures and timeline the President was to follow in negotiating a deal with Iran. It asserted Congress' full ability to review all materials in relation to any agreement made, instituting a 60-day congressional review period. The Obama Administration highlighted the positive benefits from the deal in an effort to quell the concerns of the 43 percent of the American population that did not support deals with Iran in 2013 (Poushter, 2015). The Obama Administration's White House webpage on the deal affirmed that it would prohibit "all of Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon" and framed the reversal of the "no enrichment" policy of the previous administration as pragmatic and realistic ("The Historic Deal").

The fate of the Iran Deal under the Trump Administration and the 115th Congress remains uncertain, particularly in light of Iran's most recent ballistic missile test. Although the missile test is not technically in violation of the 2015 nuclear deal, it does "defy the spirit of the U.N. resolution" (Kenyon, 2017).

Netanyahu's Speech

Following President Trump's inauguration in January 2017, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu delivered an address to the Iranian people in an effort to establish goodwill between Israel and the people of Iran. Netanyahu stated, "It struck me recently that I've spoken a lot about the Iranian regime and not enough about the Iranian people, or for that matter, to the Iranian people" (Ahren, 2017). The Prime Minister of Israel went on to say that, "by calling daily for Israel's destruction, the regime hopes to instill hostility between us. This is wrong. We are your friend, not your enemy. We've always distinguished between the Iranian people and the Iranian regime" (Ahren, 2017). Netanyahu ended his address by reaffirming that Israelis and Iranians can work together for a peaceful future.

Trump's Executive Order

On January 27, 2017, President Trump released an executive order (EO) entitled "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States." According to the EO, "aliens from countries referred to in section 217(a)(12) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12), would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and [the President] hereby suspend[s] entry into the United States, as immigrants and nonimmigrants, of such persons for 90 days from the date of this order" (Executive Order, 2017). One of the countries

included in the ban is Iran. Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn stated that Trump's decision is "bad for Europe, because it's going to strengthen even further the mistrust and hatred towards the West in the heart of the Muslim world" ("World Leaders Condemn", 2017).

Trump has released a revised EO, which he signed on March 6. This EO reinstates a travel ban on six of the same Muslim-majority countries listed in the initial EO – including Sudan, Syria, Iran, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. However, the new EO contains differences in wording to reduce legal challenges (Gulasekaram, 2017). Iraq has been removed from the latest EO, as well as components expressing a preference for religious minorities. In section 1(b) (iv) it is written that "Executive order 13769 did not provide a basis for discriminating for or against members of any particular religion" (Gulasekaram, 2017). Yet, this revised EO has already seen lawsuits in federal courts in Hawaii and Maryland. Hawaii's U.S. District Judge Derrick Watson stated on March 16 that "a reasonable, objective observer ... would conclude that the executive order was issued with a purpose to disfavor a particular religion" despite revisions excluding language pertaining to religion (Levine, 2017). To get a ruling that the EO is legal, Trump indicates that he will take the case to the Supreme Court. Washington's U.S. District Judge James Robart, who blocked the first EO last month, offered Trump a small victory by stating he has been weighing a request for a restraining order on the new EO and has not simply applied a preliminary injunction (Levine, 2017). Judge Robart considers the second EO to be substantively different from the first EO.

The Next Steps

As evidenced by the many layers of history and diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran, is difficult to contextualize the nuances of U.S.-Iran relations in brief. Considering the history behind the U.S. and Iran, the Iran Deal is a diplomatic accomplishment. If one lesson can be learned from the history of relations between the U.S. and Iran, it is that these two nations have been interlocked in a 50-year plus "tit-for-tat" battle. The U.S. reinstalls the Shah, and Iran erupts in a revolution and immediately targets the U.S. embassy. Iran engages in state sponsored terrorism, and the U.S. places economic sanctions on Iran. The U.S.'s response to Iran testing its ballistic missiles has yet to be determined.

One thing is clear - these tit-for-tat exchanges have not been working. If the current administration is concerned about stability, security, and human rights in Iran, continued diplomatic efforts and exchanges would prove more effective than isolationist policies.

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The Extent and Limitations of the North American Alliance System

By Hayley Anderson

Introduction

The three largest countries in North America- the United States, Mexico, and Canada- share more than two centuries of a dense and varied diplomatic history, defined by contentious land disputes, strict economic protectionism, and from time to time, cooperation on topics of mutual interest. The relationship expanded significantly with the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA (in Spanish, Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte; in French, Accord de libre-échange nord-américain). The document was signed in 1994, creating a trilateral trade bloc in North America and the largest area of free trade in the world.

Today, NAFTA encompasses a North American economy with a combined output of USD \$17 trillion, and a population of 444.1 billion (NAFTA, 2016). While NAFTA seems to have had an overall positive effect on all three countries' GDPs and has helped modernize the economies of Canada and Mexico, the extent of the agreement's actual benefit in the United States remains up for debate (Gandel, 2016).

When studying the North American relationship, many economists and scholars focus solely on NAFTA and its economic impact. In reality, however, NAFTA is embedded in a North American system of political and diplomatic relations that spans beyond the agreement, and the agreement created a framework to make progress on issues of mutual importance outside of free trade.

Recent trends toward populism and protectionism in the United States, as well as competition from outside economic powers like China, will threaten the North American alliance system. The future of the relationship will depend on North American leaders' abilities to bolster market interactions, coordinate responses to international crises, and work respectfully on topics of mutual interest.

I. History

Instead of a three way alliance across the North American continent that stays consistent over time, there exist four changing bilateral and trilateral partnerships that vary in degrees, methods, and topics of cooperation: the United States-Canada relationship, the United States-Mexico relationship, the Canada-Mexico relationship, and the full, trilateral relationship. It was not until the mid-20th century that strong relationships developed through economic, diplomatic, and military cooperation and a North American alliance system began to take shape.

United States-Canada Relations

The historical relationship between the United States and Canada (known before independence as the British North American Provinces) was fraught with a series of contentious land disputes in what is the present day American Northeast and Pacific Northwest. For this reason, economic engagement with the United States was a hotly debated partisan issue in Canada for a large part of the 20th century, with the Conservative Party supporting traditionally protectionist policies, and the Liberal Party advocating for freer trade. Except for military and economic cooperation in the First and Second World Wars, the United States and Canada were

not able to negotiate any official trade partnerships until 1965, when the two developed the Canada-U.S. Automotive Products Agreement (also known as the Auto Pact). The agreement was quite expansive, as it created a single North American market for passenger cars, trucks, buses, tires, and auto parts and established a basis for a U.S.- Canada trade relationship (Crane, 2006).

The Auto Pact created economic and political momentum for a more comprehensive free trade agreement between the United States and Canada (Mapi, 2014). Despite strong opposition from Canada's two major political parties, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney initiated negotiations with United States President Ronald Reagan for what would become the Canada- United States Free Trade Agreement (French: Accord de libre-échange), or CUSFTA, in 1986. By 1988, delegations from the United States and Canada signed the agreement, comprehensively eliminating barriers to most trade industries and creating incentives for cross-border investment (Government of Canada, 2016).

In the years that followed CUSFTA, the American and Canadian economies became increasingly intertwined. Canadian exports to the United States rose from about 25 percent of Canada's GDP through most of the 20th century to almost 50 percent in 2000 (Mapi, 2014). Though to a lesser extent, the United States also benefited from having freer access to the Canadian market, especially in the energy, auto manufacturing, and agricultural sectors.

CUSFTA, it turns out, had more than economic impacts. The free trade agreement between the United States and Canada was the first demonstration of global free trade outside of the European Union. It would become a model for the free trade deals that would proliferate between the United States and its global partners over the next 25 years.

United States-Mexico Relations

In its trade and diplomatic relationship with Mexico over the last two centuries, the United States encountered many of the same obstacles to engagement as in its relationship with Canada: struggles over disputed land, adverse economic protectionism, and mistrusting nationalist governments that were reluctantly willing to cooperate based on their mutual need to remain competitive in the international order. More than with Canada, however, the U.S.- Mexican relationship runs deep with antagonism, exploitation, and unilateralism (Keller, 2016). Both countries still struggle to overcome their legacy of geopolitical tensions.

Upon achieving independence from Spain in 1821, the new Mexican government inherited a country with decentralized political leadership and a host of land disputes surrounding the United States' southwestern border (Keller, 2016). The series of small territorial conflicts between the neighboring countries culminated in the bloody and imbalanced Mexican American War (known in Mexico as the North American Invasion), which ended with the U.S. conquest of 55 percent of Mexican territory. This gave the U.S. possession of three current states: Texas, California, and Utah, as well as parts of Colorado and Wyoming. Physical and diplomatic battles between the two countries lasted bitterly until 1853, when the U.S. made the Gadsden Purchase and secured its ownership of present-day southern Arizona and southwestern New Mexico (Frazier, 2006). A majority of Mexicans living in these territories decided to stay in their homes and gained American citizenship, making Mexican-Americans one of the largest minority populations in the United States and a critical group involved in settling and developing the southwest part of the country.

For a large part of the 20th century, the United States and Mexico maintained a distant, if not unfriendly, diplomatic relationship. Each country fortified its borders and focused on internal nation-building, but relied

on one another for labor, natural resources, manufacturing, and infrastructural investment. Additionally, the two governments played important but contradictory roles in one another's military engagements: for example, the United States acted as a safe haven for key Mexican rebels during the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), but invaded Mexican territory with the goals of occupying the Port of Veracruz to protect its favorable trade position and capturing the revolutionary hero Francisco "Pancho" Villa. This led the Mexican government to break its "neutrality" during World War I by entering into secret collaboration with German Secretary of State, Arthur Zimmerman.

Cooperation between the United States and Mexico during the Second World War led the two neighboring countries to develop closer economic and diplomatic ties during the second half of the 20th century. This relationship, however, was and continues to be tainted by a history of ethically questionable immigration, economic, and labor market actions on the part of both Mexico and the United States.

Canada-Mexico Relations

Historically, the diplomatic relationship between Canada and Mexico was relatively dormant between Canadian independence in 1866 and World War II, when the two cooperated on behalf of the Allied Powers. In 1968, the leaders of both nations set up a joint ministerial commission and agreed to meet every two years to discuss mutual interests and deepen their bilateral relationship; the partnership between Canada and Mexico resulted in the 1974 expansion of the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP), which currently allows about 8,000 Mexican workers to join the Canadian agricultural labor force every year (Basok, 2007). While the bilateral Canada-Mexico relationship appears extremely small in comparison to each country's association with the United States, the extent of the relationship is often masked by transactions between the two countries in which the United States is the common broker.

The Trilateral North American Relationship

While official trilateral trade and diplomatic policies were not historically implemented before NAFTA, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have depended on one another in small and informal ways throughout their history, often leveraging bilateral relationships on the continent to meet their goals. The relations between all three countries, in trade and other sectors, escalated astronomically after the development of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the first agreement of its kind in the western hemisphere.

II. Development of NAFTA

The conception of a North American Free Trade Agreement fundamentally changed the dynamics of the historical trilateral relationship between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. When negotiations first began under George H.W. Bush in January of 1990, the trade deal was intended to be a bilateral one between the United States and Mexico (Hoover Institute, 2014). The United States signed CUSFTA in 1988, and hoped that a similar agreement with its southern neighbor would cause it to open its protectionist economy to foreign trade and investment, as Mexico was seen as both a promising new market for U.S. exports and a lower cost investment location with high economic potential (McBride & Sergie, 2016).

The bilateral U.S-Mexico agreement was on a deadline through President Bush's Fast Track authority, when Canadian Minister of International Trade, John Crosbie, called the American and Mexican negotiators to request that Canada be included in the agreement (Boskin, 2014). Plans for the original bilateral agreement were canceled and in February 1991, U.S. President George H.W. Bush, Mexican President Carlos Salinas,

and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney issued a press announcement of their intent to negotiate a trilateral deal. The decision to pursue a North American free trade arrangement was an unprecedented push for economic integration between two highly developed countries, the United States and Canada, and a developing country, Mexico.

Once the agreement was negotiated, debates took place in each country as to whether or not it would pass into law. Political opposition to the agreement in Mexico and Canada centered on a fear of Americanization. In a 2014 interview, Canada's prime negotiator, Michael Wilson, recalled that Canada feared losing its economic sovereignty to the United States, which is about 10 times larger in both GDP and population (Boskin, 2014). Mexican representatives cited a fear that their country was being "sold out" the United States, which had historically abused Mexico's natural resources and low-wage labor force for cheap agricultural and manufacturing production (Hoover Institute, 2014). Additionally, Mexico feared the economic ramifications of opening its traditionally protectionist manufacturing industry, which would need to experience an enormous overhaul in order to meet the terms of the agreement.

Ultimately, Mexico and Canada prioritized access to the market of their number one trading partner and, by almost any measure, the largest economy in the world. Both saw this trilateral partnership as an opportunity for market expansion and to move toward modernized economies.

Bush and his team were bitterly constrained by domestic interest groups that opposed global free trade because of its apparent negative implications for labor and environmental protection. Specifically, opponents of NAFTA feared that wage differentials with Mexico would send U.S. jobs abroad and allow companies to evade U.S. worker safety regulations (McBride & Sergie, 2016). Ross Perot fueled this argument by stating that trade liberalization would lead to a "giant sucking sound" of American jobs to Mexico. Environmental organizations presented strong arguments to allege that NAFTA would increase pollution and decrease opportunities for the government to regulate high waste-producing industries (Smith, 1993).

After a long and emotional debate, the United States House of Representatives passed the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act on November 17, 1993, with 234 voting for the agreement (102 Democrats and 132 Republicans), and 200 voting against it (GovTrack, 1993). NAFTA was ratified on December 8, 1994 and went into effect on January 1 of the following year, creating the first official trilateral agreement between the North American powers, and the largest trade deal of its kind anywhere in the world.

III. The Meaning of NAFTA

The North American Free Trade Agreement was implemented on January 1, 1994, with the primary goal of eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada. The agreement has eight parts and 22 total chapters that cover the legal guidelines of the trilateral relationship on the topics of: trade in goods, customs procedures, intellectual property, energy and petrochemicals, and agriculture.

Trade in Goods and Customs Procedures

Chapters 2 through 5 of NAFTA cover the market side of the agreement, including: national treatment and market access for goods, tariff elimination, non-tariff barrier elimination, and customs procedures. By the time North American leaders signed NAFTA, most of U.S.- Canadian trade was already duty free. For that reason, the primary immediate result was the elimination of tariffs on over half of exports from Mexico to the U.S., and one third of U.S. exports to Mexico. Chief negotiator for the United States, Carla Hills stated that,

“after negotiations, the agreement achieved broader and deeper business openings than any prior trade agreement” (Hoover Institute, 2014). The signing of this agreement created the largest trade bloc in the world.

Intellectual Property

Chapter 17 of NAFTA represents the first holistic agreement on international intellectual property rights. It states that “each party shall provide in its territory adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, while ensuring that measures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade” (OAS, 2016). In practice, this set minimum standards for upholding intellectual property rights (which include copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, logos, and patents) and allowed individual countries to build upon those protections. Prior to NAFTA, different standards of intellectual property inhibited the willingness of companies to work in other North American countries. The establishment of baseline intellectual property rights has allowed more engagement between U.S., Canadian, and Mexican firms.

Energy and Petrochemicals

Chapter 6 of NAFTA, which covers energy in the trilateral relationship, is noticeably not comprehensive. This portion of the agreement removes import and export restrictions on trade in energy and basic petrochemical goods, but only applies to the United States and Canada. In practice, this portion of the agreement has led to a significant interdependence in bilateral energy consumption and trade. Canada and the United States are now one another’s largest import and export partner in energy trade (EIA, 2016). In 2015, the United States imported an average of 9.4 million barrels of crude oil per day, 40 percent of which came Canada. Crude petroleum is also Canada’s biggest export, making up 19 percent of total exports (OEC, 2016a).

Mexico excluded itself from this portion of the agreement, as its constitution restricted foreign participation in its energy and petroleum sector until Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto successfully passed an amendment to change it in 2013. While Mexico has not effectively entered into this part of the trade arrangement, its contributions to the North American energy sector are still significant. Mexico’s oil and petroleum make up about 9 percent of the country’s total exports; the products of this industry are exported most to its North American trade partners, the United States and Canada (OEC, 2016b). Because Mexico and its allies are not preferential partners in oil trade, however, Mexico has recently decided to increase its presence in the East Asian and Southern European markets; its exports to the United States have fallen 18 percent since July 2015 (Smith, 2016).

Agriculture

Agreements relating to agriculture are covered in Chapter 7 of NAFTA. This segment essentially removes all restrictions on trade of agricultural products between the United States and Mexico over a period of 14 years (all restrictions were lifted by January 1, 2008) (USDA, 2008). Just as Mexico refrained from partaking in the opening of its energy sector, Canada declined to be a part of an unrestricted agricultural trade relationship through NAFTA. Instead, it maintains separate bilateral agricultural trade agreements with both the United States and Mexico. The U.S. and Canada uphold the agricultural provisions set out by the U.S.- Canada Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1988, which removed tariffs affecting all agricultural trade between the U.S. and Canada, with the exception of a few items covered by tariff-rate quotas. Canada and Mexico came to a

parallel bilateral agreement on market access for agricultural products; under this agreement, most tariffs between the two countries were lifted within 15 years.

Labor: Side Agreement (NAALC)

Negotiators incorporated two parallel agreements to NAFTA, one dealing with labor regulations and another addressing environmental issues. These arrangements were negotiated with the primary purpose of limiting the anxieties of (primarily domestic American) public interest groups that protested the move toward globalization.

The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) was negotiated in parallel with the larger North American Free Trade Agreement in order to create employment opportunities, enhance global competitiveness, and protect basic workers' rights across partner countries in North America. The document established a Commission for Labor Cooperation that consists of a Ministerial Council and a Secretariat (NAFTA Now, 2012). According to NAFTA's website, current programs for labor cooperation focus on occupational safety and health, employment training, and workers' rights.

Environment: Side Agreement (NAAEC)

The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) commits the United States, Mexico, and Canada to taking certain steps to protect the environment. Obligations for each partner country include monitoring environmental degradation, promoting environmental education, furthering scientific research on environmental matters, and enforcing domestic and regional environmental regulations (NAFTA Now, 2012). NAAEC created a mechanism for any person or organization to report an alleged breach to this arrangement, and uses the same enforcement mechanisms as in the commercial side of the agreement.

Immediate Political Reactions

The battle to pass NAFTA was won, not in accordance with, but in spite of public opinion in all three nations. With that, the process of gaining approval for the agreement after it came into force was a challenging one as well.

Formalizing the U.S.-Canada-Mexico trilateral alliance system through the North American Free Trade Agreement is often seen as fitting into larger trend following the Cold War: North American countries largely abandoned their protectionist economic policies and expanded the liberal international order by negotiating initiatives like the Kyoto Protocol, International Criminal Court, North Atlantic Trade Organization, and World Trade Organization. Many thousands of concerned citizens, such as those represented by the labor and environmental groups described previously, felt that their values and visions of the future were left out of these international negotiations. Their resentment manifested itself in anti-globalization movements throughout the 1990s (McCormick, 2012). Protests against the WTO meeting in 1999, though much larger, represent the same interests as those fighting against NAFTA five years prior.

The anti-globalization sentiment changed, at least briefly, after the tragedy of September 11, 2001. President George W. Bush was able to galvanize public concern about a security threat to renew the perceived public need for an organized world order, and therefore, the need for NAFTA (McCormick, 2012).

IV. Impacts

Twenty-three years after NAFTA was signed, it is clear that the removal of trade barriers between the United States, Mexico, and Canada, had mixed impacts and created big-time winners and losers. On the whole, regional trade increased sharply in the agreement's first two decades from approximately \$290 billion in 1993 to over \$1.1 trillion in 2016 (McBride & Sergie, 2016). NAFTA contributed to the development of the cross-border supply chain, lowered costs of manufacturing, and increased the region's competitiveness among partner countries and in business dealings across the world. The agreement, however, favored big businesses that were able to be competitive in the continental market; job losses were heavily concentrated among small farmers, ranchers, and manufacturers within Mexico and the United States.

Results for Mexico

Mexico, the smallest economy of the trilateral agreement, stood the most to gain from wider access to the larger and more diversified economies of the United States and Canada (Boskin, 2014). The agreement brought an end to the near 100 percent import licensing requirement and began Mexico's transition toward an export-driven, industrialized economy that welcomed high levels of foreign investment. These moves undeniably modernized the country's economic system, and created hundreds of thousand jobs in the manufacturing industry (McBride & Sergie, 2016).

While Mexico's GINI index³ has fallen steadily in the years after NAFTA, the benefits have been concentrated in the middle class. Between 1993 and 2013, Mexico's economy grew at an unsteady rate, averaging at just 1.3 percent per year and drove up unemployment among small farmers, encouraging legal and illegal immigration to the United States (a trend that peaked in 2007) (World Bank, 2017; Gonzalez-Barrera, 2015).

NAFTA may have also had an unanticipated impact on the Mexican political system. With the opening of Mexico's highly protectionist economy, generally falling poverty levels and corruption indicators have led many experts to believe that formalizing the trilateral alliance system created the conditions for Mexico's unexpected transition to a multiparty democracy. In theory, NAFTA created the circumstances that allowed the peaceful transition of power from Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which dominated government since 1929, to the opposing National Action Party (PAN), in the historic 2000 presidential election (Hoover Institute, 2014).

Results for Canada

Canada had a very high tariff wall before CUSFTA and then NAFTA, which prevented competition and stifled innovation. The opening led to an enormous wave of foreign direct investment, which grew from \$110 billion in 1993 to \$346 billion in 2016, with about the same amount being accrued through exports (McBride & Sergie, 2016). By far, the most expanded industry is in agricultural trade with the United States.

Despite these positive cash flows, Canada has not been able to quite catch up with its southern neighbor in manufacturing or production. Canada's manufacturing employment did not significantly change after

³ The GINI index is a measurement of the net income distribution of a country's residents, which helps define the gap between the rich and the poor; an index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 1 represents perfect inequality.

NAFTA, and the “productivity gap” between the United States and Canada has remained at a steady 72 percent throughout the duration of the agreement (McBride & Sergie, 2016).

Results for the United States

Economists generally agree that the United States gained a modest economic boost after the creation of NAFTA, including a 0.5 percent increase in GDP and \$80 billion in additional trade surplus. Supporters estimate that as many as 14 million jobs rely on trade with Canada and Mexico (McBride & Sergie, 2016). These positive impacts, however, are not widely felt in the United States; under this agreement, costs are highly concentrated in specific industries, such as manufacturing and small-scale agriculture, while benefits are spread thinly across society.

Many critics in the United States blame NAFTA for sending jobs overseas and stagnating wages in the American manufacturing sector, which lost approximately 6 million domestic jobs between 2000 and 2010 (Meltzer & Bahar, 2017). It is difficult to separate these trends from global changes to the industry, however, as the rising competitiveness of the Chinese manufacturing sector and increased technological automation also play a large role in the loss of domestic U.S. manufacturing jobs.

Trade Balance

The United States is still the largest economy of the North American partners and maintains a trade surplus with Canada and Mexico in most categories of goods and services (World Bank, 2016). Where the United States falls short is in balancing its enormous importation of fossil fuels and their byproducts from other NAFTA countries. This resulted in the annual cost of U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico exceeding the value of U.S. exports by an average of \$39 billion and \$34 billion, respectively, since 1994 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). The Office of the United States Trade Representative claims that these high levels of imports from NAFTA countries “have increased the competitiveness of American businesses” (USTR, 2016).

Immigration and Mobility of People

While not officially in the agreement, immigration and the mobility of people between NAFTA partner countries is a large part of the trilateral relationship. For one, NAFTA led to the creation of the nonimmigrant NAFTA Professional (TN) visa, specifically for citizens of Canada and Mexico to live and work in the United States, as long as they have arrangements for full-time or part-time employment with a U.S. company in one of 62 designated professions (ranging from Landscape Surveyor to Librarian) (U.S. Department of State, 2017). Unlike the H-1B visa, there is no annual cap on the number of TN visa recipients. This allowed for more legal admission of immigrants from NAFTA partners into the United States. In 2002, the United States admitted 219,380 Mexican citizens as immigrants, making Mexico the country of origin of the largest number of legal entrants into the United States at 20.6 percent of total admissions. In the same year, the United States admitted 19,519 Canadians into the United States, representing only about 1.8 percent of total legal admissions (Meyers & Jachimowicz, 2003).

Illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States grew significantly under NAFTA as well, as small-scale Mexican farmers suffered from the removal of their government’s trade protections in 1994. The trend peaked in 2007, when approximately 12.8 million Mexicans were living in the United States illegally (Gonzalez-Barrera, 2015). Since the great recession, the net migration to and from the United States has been

negative, with a total loss of 140,000 undocumented people in the United States between 2009 and 2014. Management of border security is a contentious issue in the North American relationship.

V. The Limitations of North American Community Development

It is important to note that, in practice, the trilateral North American alliance system extends further than the open economic engagement framework created by NAFTA. The relationship created a precedent for geopolitical cooperation on mutual interests other than trade. For example, NAFTA partner countries played a large role in securing the United States' borders after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and in delivering aid after Hurricane Katrina.

This cooperation, however, is limited in scope. While there is a potential for more social, environmental, and diplomatic cooperation, NAFTA partner leaders, including Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, showed a reluctance to move the trilateral relationship toward any further institutional cooperation to meet these goals. For example, the influential 2005 task force report entitled *Building a North American Community* is a trilateral publication sponsored by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations that primarily addresses North America's vulnerabilities (i.e., terrorism, security threats, and domestic inequality). Despite its nominal focus on the "North American community," the report refutes the idea of creating "shared bureaucratic schemes of confederation or union," in the interest of maintaining a strict sense of national sovereignty (Council on Foreign Relations, 2005). In fact, politicians and public interest organizations in the United States, Mexico, and Canada have explicitly stated a goal of avoiding a European Union model (Clarkson, 2008).

Reflecting the United States' reluctance to build a continental framework for cooperation, the three NAFTA partners have exhibited a reluctance to move past "dual-bilateral relationship" model, where the United States acts a common ally rather than an equal partner in a trilateral relationship. For example, there are two separate programs for expedited border crossing in North America, one for citizens of the United States and Mexico (called "NEXUS") and one for citizens of the United States and Canada (known as "SENTRI"), but no program that eases border passage for the entire North American continent (Council on Foreign Relations, 2005). Beginning in 2005, American, Canadian, and Mexican heads of state tried to address this disjointedness by holding an annual North American Leader's Conference (Sands, 2016); while symbolic, the summit has not lead to any new meaningful trilateral action on issues of mutual importance.

VI. NAFTA Today

While NAFTA has come up as a point of contention in every United States presidential election season since its conception, 2016 was particularly damaging. President-elect Donald Trump expressed strong resentment toward NAFTA during his campaign, calling the agreement "the single worst trade deal ever approved" (Severns, 2016). Trump and his supporters also repeated continual disapproval of the North American alliance system, and at times, made blatant verbal attacks on Mexico and its people.

Following Trump's inauguration in 2017, the President stated that he intends to open the deal for renegotiation. Many experts have attempted to evaluate what the effects of a renegotiation might be. In the least invasive scenario, Trump will only attempt to make minor alterations to the body of the agreement. Prior to the inauguration, for example, President Trump's transition team backpedaled on his promise to "tear up" the trade deal. Anthony Scaramucci, a senior advisor on Trump's team, recently reinterpreted the meaning of Trump's campaign promise. He said, "I don't think we're looking to rip NAFTA up as much as

we are looking to right-size it and make it fairer. I don't think anybody in the administration is looking for protectionism. We know the harm and impact that would take" (Bolton, 2016).

Trump's adamancy on the campaign trail and after the election (renegotiating or withdrawing from NAFTA is on the top of Trump's list of priorities for his first 100 days in office, and Trump has been rumored to be drafting an executive order on the issue) suggests that he plans to take more dramatic steps to dismantle the trade agreement. If the United States withdraws, it will not only lose free access to its two largest export markets, but also the support of its two strongest trade and diplomatic allies. In anticipation of increased U.S. protectionism, both Canada and Mexico have developed free trade agreements and oil partnerships with U.S. competitors in the European Union, Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East (Marsden, 2016).

Mexican and Canadian leaders realize the strong possibility of a policy change and have expressed a willingness to work with the new administration to renegotiate the terms of the North American alliance system. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Mexican Economy Minister Ildefonso Guajardo both stated that they are "open to talking" (Geewax, 2016). Both countries, however, have economic leverage and a strong interest in strengthening NAFTA, not picking it apart.

The move to "terminate" or "entirely renegotiate" NAFTA, as the president suggested, will likely also cause anger among domestic companies and industry stakeholders that benefit from freer trade. Canada, for example, is in the top four export markets in nearly every one of the 30 states that voted for Donald Trump, and number one in 23 of them (Marsden, 2016). If Trump decides to pursue high-level renegotiation of the agreement, he should expect a tense political battle, especially if Canada and Mexico are able to activate their partners in those states.

Regardless of whether or not there are substantial changes to the agreement, the general rise of populist, isolationist, and xenophobic sentiments across North America will constrain the trilateral relationship. Mexican President Peña Nieto stated that many of Trump's broad campaign assertions (such as wanting to border wall and labeling many Mexican immigrants "rapists and criminals") "regrettably hurt and affected Mexicans" (Collins & Diamond, 2016). It is difficult to imagine that these statements, and similar statements since Trump's election, will not strain the diplomatic relationship that the United States and Mexico have spent a century building.

VII. Conclusion

The North American alliance system is historically contradictory and followed a similar pattern. Primarily through parallel bilateral relationships (Canada- U.S. and Mexico- U.S.), the three countries have swung from long periods of isolationism and protectionism, to moments of economic and diplomatic openness. NAFTA has definitively facilitated a prolonged stretch in the latter direction, causing the North American political economy and each country's population to veer closer together, entering the 21st century on a distinct path toward high growth and modernization.

After over 20 years of trilateral trade and diplomacy that have benefitted the United States, Canada, and Mexico in many ways, it is surprising that the three countries have not seized on other opportunities to collaborate meaningfully on issues of mutual interest. It seems reasonable to believe that the trade partners and continental neighbors would find more place to strike deals, perhaps on environmental protection, energy independence, immigration or the multinational war on terror.

The opposition to such cooperation, however, is growing larger and louder. In the two decades NAFTA's conception, those that lost from the agreement have not given up their protest; NAFTA is being blamed for larger trends that alter the labor force, such as the rising demand for high rather than low-skill labor, increased mechanization of work, and the compounding threat of the competitive Chinese manufacturing economy. To many, the 2016 U.S. presidential election acted as a referendum on free trade, and the result is fairly clear: instead of cooperation, the scale is tipping toward American isolationism and protectionism.

Even those that recognize the merits of the agreement are reluctant to tie NAFTA into a larger "North American community" that would be able to utilize its trilateral power to overcome threats and vulnerabilities, as listed above, in explicit opposition to becoming a European Union-like bureaucracy.

The U.S. election of Donald Trump, as well as larger global trends of protectionism and the rising competitiveness of China, will threaten NAFTA and the North American alliance system. The future of the relationship will depend on new a trilateral willingness to bolster each partner's competitiveness in the realm of trade and collaborate on topics of mutual importance.

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The Madman and the Bomb: Nuclear Blackmail in the Trump Era

By Todd S. Sechser, Ph.D., and Matthew Fuhrmann, Ph.D.

President Donald Trump has now assumed control over the nation's arsenal of more than 4,000 nuclear weapons. What will he do with them? We do not yet know the Trump administration's approach to nuclear strategy, but Mr. Trump has offered some clues to his mindset. He has denounced nuclear arms control, declaring that he would welcome a renewed nuclear arms race with Russia (Shear and Sanger, 2016). He has indicated that he might be willing to allow Japan and other U.S. allies to acquire nuclear weapons (*New York Times*, 2016a). And he has suggested that he might be willing to use nuclear weapons against the Islamic State (msnbc, 2016).

These statements are consistent with a broader theme in Mr. Trump's approach toward nuclear weapons and foreign policy: unpredictability. "We must as a nation be more unpredictable," he declared in a foreign policy speech during the 2016 presidential campaign. "We have to be unpredictable, and we have to be unpredictable starting now" (*New York Times*, 2016b). In his past business dealings, Mr. Trump argues, it was advantageous to be seen as unpredictable. It kept adversaries off-balance and nervous about what he might do next. By this reasoning, the United States could also benefit from engaging in unexpected behavior, particularly with respect to nuclear weapons.

Mr. Trump is not the first to advance these claims. Indeed, there is a rich intellectual tradition behind the idea that nuclear strategy requires a dash of unpredictability – or even irrationality.

NUCLEAR THREATS AND UNPREDICTABILITY

In the 1950s and 1960s, economist Thomas Schelling observed that the fundamental problem with nuclear threats is that they are not credible. When facing a nuclear-armed adversary, leaders know that using nuclear weapons could invite devastating retaliation. Threatening to launch a nuclear attack against another nuclear state would be dismissed immediately as a bluff. As John F. Kennedy's national security adviser once noted, "A decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable" (Bundy, 1969, p. 9–10). Even attacking a non-nuclear adversary with nuclear weapons could carry tremendous costs, branding the attacker as an international pariah and motivating other countries to align against it. Nuclear threats, in short, are not believable, as the costs of executing them are simply too high.

The credibility problem is especially severe, Schelling argued, for nuclear threats that are intended to convince an adversary to change its behavior or relinquish something valuable. Schelling's term for this kind of coercive situation was "compellence" (Schelling, 1966, p. 69–90). When engaging in nuclear compellence, following through on a threat requires the coercer to be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict – and perhaps initiate the conflict altogether. But moving first is inherently more difficult than retaliating. For this reason, Schelling argued, nuclear compellence is harder than deterrence.

How, then, can leaders use nuclear weapons for compellence, if no rational leader would ever start a nuclear war? Schelling's answer was both startling and clever: threaten to do *inadvertently* what one would never do intentionally. Consider the following metaphor. Two mountain climbers stand near the edge of a cliff, tied

together by a length of rope. If one climber wishes to coerce her partner, she cannot credibly threaten to jump off the cliff – her partner will not believe her. However, if she inches toward the edge of the cliff, she creates a risk that some unanticipated event – a gust of wind, a loose rock, momentary vertigo – will cause one to slip off the edge and carry both to their death. As the two move closer and closer to the edge, this shared risk increases. The encounter then ends in one of two ways. Either the dreaded accident actually occurs and the pair falls to their death or, more likely, one party loses her nerve and gives in (Schelling, 1966, p. 99).

Nuclear threats, in Schelling's view, have this same dangerous quality. In any nuclear crisis, there is a risk that some unanticipated event will carry the two sides into a nuclear conflict that neither side wanted. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis offers several examples of how this could happen. During the tense two-week crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union experienced numerous incidents that could have led to inadvertent war (Sagan, 1993; Dobbs, 2008). For example, a U.S. pilot became confused and accidentally flew his U-2 reconnaissance plane into Soviet airspace, narrowly avoiding a clash between Soviet interceptors and nuclear-armed U.S. escort jets. U.S. radar stations falsely detected Soviet ballistic missile launches on several occasions, due to technical malfunctions and happenstance events (such as the explosion of a Soviet satellite in orbit). And perhaps most dangerously, at the tensest moment of the confrontation, Soviet surface-to-air missile operators in Cuba shot down a U.S. spy plane, in violation of their instructions from Moscow. These events all occurred beyond the control of national leaders – and could have had catastrophic consequences.

But for Schelling, the unpredictability of crisis confrontations is precisely the point. In his view, a nuclear threat is a “threat that leaves something to chance” (Schelling, 1960, p. 187–203). In other words, there is always a chance that leaders will lose control during a crisis, resulting in a war that neither side intended. Moreover, leaders can take deliberate actions – such as alerting nuclear assets, pre-delegating nuclear launch authority to field officers, or deploying forces near those of the adversary – that increase this risk. An adversary might not believe that you would intentionally start a nuclear war, but the mounting danger of an accidental war might persuade him to back down and end the crisis. Indeed, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev seems to have been quite worried about the possibility of losing control in 1962, imploring President John F. Kennedy “not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war...a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it” (U.S. Department of State, 1996).

Nuclear brinkmanship therefore turns not on the willingness of the coercer to start a nuclear war, but instead, on its ability to tolerate the risk that such a war might come about accidentally, in a way nobody could have predicted. As Schelling (1966, p. 109) explains, “It is our sheer inability to predict the consequences of our actions and to keep things under control, and the enemy's similar inability, that can intimidate the enemy (and, of course, us too).” Unpredictability, in this story, is a virtue, not a vice.

THE BRINKMANSHIP MYTH

The logic of brinkmanship seems to offer a solution to the problem of credibility in nuclear confrontations. But it works much better in theory than in practice.


The logic of brinkmanship views nuclear confrontations as competitions of risk-taking, in which the danger of inadvertence rises until one side loses its nerve and backs down. The implicit assumption is that both sides are acutely aware of the risk of losing control during the crisis, and become intimidated when that risk becomes intolerable. But psychologists have long known that individuals are susceptible to the “illusion of

control”: the false belief that one is in control of events that are actually caused by external factors (Langer, 1975; Jervis, 1976, p. 44–48). Individuals in positions of authority – such as national leaders – are particularly susceptible to this bias. Consequently, leaders typically do not comprehend the true level of danger that they face in a crisis. They tend to overestimate their ability to maintain control over events and prevent accidental escalation. As a result, the risk of inadvertence is unlikely to persuade leaders to capitulate, since they believe they can maintain control of the crisis. Khrushchev’s recognition of the dangers of inadvertence in 1962 was notable not because it was typical, but rather, because it is so rare.

In our book *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*, we examine the behavior of leaders in nineteen different crises. In each of these crises, one side attempted to use nuclear threats – sometimes vague, sometimes explicit – to compel another state to make concessions. What we found surprised both of us: in almost none of these crises did leaders express the sort of concerns about losing control that Schelling’s logic of brinkmanship would expect. In most crises, leaders are not preoccupied with the possibility that they might accidentally stumble into a war they did not want. Even in the Cuban missile crisis, many of the key participants denied that nuclear weapons had anything to do with the outcome of the crisis. Robert McNamara, Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense during the crisis, argued that the Soviets “were finally forced out, but it was not through the threat of use of nuclear weapons.” Instead, he argued, “It was our tremendous conventional power in the region which forced the Soviets to take those missiles out” (Charlton, 1987, p. 23). Thus, even in the episode that has long been considered the archetype for nuclear coercion, the evidence is actually quite mixed.

McNamara’s instinct is borne out by a broader look at the historical record. Using a database of more than 200 episodes of attempted military coercion during the 20th century (Sechser, 2011; 2017), we compared the success rate of nuclear-armed coercers to that of non-nuclear coercers. The logic of nuclear brinkmanship holds that nuclear-armed countries should have an advantage in these coercive situations, since they can create risks of inadvertence that non-nuclear countries cannot. Tumbling off the cliff into war is always costly, but against a nuclear-armed opponent, it could be devastating. Yet we found that nuclear weapons do not appear to provide an advantage in coercive episodes: as Figure 1 demonstrates, the success rate for nuclear-armed coercers is no higher – and in fact is slightly lower – than the success rate for non-nuclear countries (Sechser and Fuhrmann, 2013). The coercive value of nuclear weapons, it would seem, is not vindicated by the historical record.

Figure 1: Coercive Threat Success Rates, 1918–2001.



Source: Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 84.

An example helps illustrate how difficult it is to use unpredictability as a coercive bargaining tool in nuclear crises. In 1969, just a few months after taking office, President Richard Nixon sought to fulfill his campaign promise of ending the Vietnam War on terms favorable to the United States. After being stonewalled repeatedly by North Vietnamese negotiators, U.S. leaders reasoned that only Soviet pressure could convince North Vietnam to make concessions at the bargaining table. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, settled on a novel solution for obtaining Soviet cooperation: “We must worry the Soviets about the possibility that we might lose our patience and may get out of control,” Kissinger wrote (1969, p. 6). To do so, Nixon and Kissinger devised an operation code-named Giant Lance, which called for a series of steps designed to make the Soviets think that the United States was planning a nuclear attack (Sagan and Suri, 2003; Burr and Kimball, 2003; 2015). One of these actions involved sending 18 nuclear-armed B-52 bombers on a flight path straight toward the Soviet Union. The bombers would pull back just before crossing into Soviet airspace, and spend several days circling ominously near the Soviet border.

Nixon’s logic came straight from the Schelling playbook – and echoes President Trump’s recent remarks about the virtues of unpredictability. “I just want to keep them off balance. Keep them questioning what I will do,” Nixon declared (Sagan and Suri, 2003, p. 158). He told his Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman:

I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe that I’ve reached the point that I might do *anything* to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that, ‘for God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry – and he has his hand on the nuclear button’ – and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace. (Haldeman, 1978, 83)

Indeed, just before the alert operation began, Nixon instructed Kissinger to meet with the Soviet ambassador, “shake his head and say, ‘I am sorry, Mr. Ambassador, but Nixon is out of control’” (U.S. Department of State, 2007, p. 87).

How did Nixon’s implementation of brinkmanship fare? In one respect, Nixon’s strategy succeeded: the Soviet ambassador to the United States cabled back to his superiors remarking on Nixon’s “growing emotionalism and lack of balance with respect to events related to Vietnam” (U.S. Department of State, 2007, p. 99). But the madman strategy failed to achieve its intended result of coercing the Soviets and intimidating North Vietnam. At best, the Soviets were confused by the alert operation and did not understand its purpose; at worst, they saw it as a bluff (Burr and Kimball, 2003, p. 147–48). But, contrary to the expectations of brinkmanship theory, they did not capitulate out of fear of being dragged inadvertently over the nuclear cliff.

CONCLUSION

President Trump has touted the virtues of unpredictability in foreign policy. He is not the first to do so: vaunted scholars of nuclear strategy, as well as U.S. presidents, have believed that cultivating an image of being irrational or out of control can be a coercive tool, particularly when nuclear weapons are involved. But the reality is that while Schelling’s “threat that leaves something to chance” is an elegant solution to a thorny theoretical problem, it has a poor track record of real-world success. When leaders have attempted to use nuclear threats for coercion, they have almost always failed.

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